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his EAP completes 31 years
and includes “items of interest”
and “citations received.” Architect and sacred geometer Keith
Critchlow died in London in April; see an
“in memoriam” on p. 4. Note the flower
photographs from his last book—The Hidden Geometry of Flowers (2011)—right.
We include two “book notes,” the first
focusing on philosopher Dermot Moran’s
study, Husserl’s Crisis of the European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (2010). We highlight philosopher
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic’s The Wonder
of Water (2020), an edited collection examining how human experience relates to
decisions about water.
This EAP includes four essays. Torontonian Robert Fabian provides an update on
downtown neighborhood planning in his
city. Second, philosopher John Russon
explores the ambiguity of travelling to a
foreign place. Third, independent researcher Stephen Wood writes about two
contrasting modes of science teaching—
what he calls “knowledge-based learning”
vs. “understanding-based learning.”
Some readers will remember that, in the
last four EAP issues, we have run a series
of essays on Goethean science by the late
science educator Henri Bortoft. Several
readers requested that we integrate the four
entries into one, which we have done in
this issue. By far this is the longest essay
EAP has ever run; we are honored to include it because Bortoft’s work offers an
unusual new manner of understanding,
grounded in “authentic wholeness.” We
thank Jacqueline Bortoft for allowing us
to include the full essay here.
Right: Photographs from Keith Critchlow’s The Hidden Geometry of Flowers
(2011, p. 181). These flowers, representing
“five-ness” geometrically, are among the
most common of British wildflowers. See
the “in memoriam” for Critchlow on p. 4.
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Place and COVID-19
As we continue to be threatened by the
pandemic, one wonders whether and how
the human relationship with place will
change. As phenomenologist Maurice
Merleau-Ponty emphasized, intercorporeality—i.e., human bodies together in physical space—is an integral aspect of human
being. How this key social need is to be reintegrated via social distancing and voluntary isolation is a difficult question that
may or may not find a workable answer.
One of the most astute commentators on
COVID-19 is Andrew Sullivan, former
blogger and columnist for New York Magazine. His recent takes on the pandemic
have been especially perceptive and, below, we reproduce a portion of the NYM
column he wrote for Friday, May 15, 2020.
Sullivan lives in Washington, D.C.

An accelerating
social atomization?
None of us has any solid notion yet of
quite how transformative our current
plague will be…. But one thing really
does seem clear. All the trends in the
culture that have led us to withdraw
physically from one another, to live in
an online space, to replace real life
with virtual existence: These shifts
have all been artificially accelerated.
The essential socializing mechanisms of school and college, from kindergarten onward, have evaporated
overnight. Religious practice, for so
long a communal and physical thing, is
suspended in midair, the sacraments
withheld, the rituals that bind us together as Christians or Jews or Muslims and connect us to the past abandoned.
Workplaces, our other major forum
for socialization, have disappeared into
thin air, as Zoom meetings proliferate,
and we live in a Brady Bunch square
set onscreen. Public transport that
forced us to interact with one another
daily continues for essential workers—
but in a far more attenuated way for
most white-collar and affluent Americans, further dividing classes.

Doctors diagnose through screens;
therapists are on speaker phones;
friends are on FaceTime and nowhere
else. Evolving media technologies that
were slowly gaining speed have been
suddenly sucked from the future into
the present….
The struggle of small, local retail
stores, already pummeled by Amazon,
gets more intense and doomed each
day. And they are not just economic
units: They’re social ones. They’re
where we see neighbors and strangers
and friends.
The collective human experience of
a football or basketball game cannot be
replicated in an empty stadium; the comedian cannot bring people together
around a joke that ends in silence; the
dates we once had—for a play or a
movie or a concert—have had to end.
In a crisis of loneliness, we have somehow managed to make life lonelier
still.
The restaurants that have helped regenerate neighborhoods and sustain
new communities are being culled at a
terrifying rate. The bars where we
flirted; the coffee shops where we
worked and chatted; the gyms where
we recognized familiar faces: These
are all in suspension, underlining modernity’s already dehumanizing solitude.
Even family life, which is an essential base for so much of our social activity, can’t play the role it should.
Packing everyone into the same space
all day and night, with no outlet for
others, is a recipe for marital failure
and family suffocation. The abuse of
spouses and children this crisis has enabled will echo into the future.
Extramarital sex has gone completely virtual—an ephemeral series of
online flirtations and porn fantasies.
We barely even acknowledge one another in supermarkets, our faces
masked, our hands in gloves, our distance nervously kept. Social media—
the addictive, distractive habit we were
trying to get some handle on—is now
the only real-time socialization we
have. After some success at weaning

myself off my phone, I’ve never spent
so much time on it.
This is not so far, it seems to me, a
revolutionary moment for change away
from our recent past. At least not yet.
It’s more like a fast-forward of existing
trends, a speeding up of social atomization, even as the cultural wreckage remains.
Perhaps this will in turn prompt a reaction and help us restore the human to
our world. But humans adjust, and this
time we have had to adjust very
quickly. The tools we have used to
keep going in this era will surely remain in our hands—we will get used to
them, and, in turn, we will get attached
to them. Insofar as they have made
businesses more efficient, or our own
lives simpler, they’ll stick.
The quiet out there that seemed so
shocking only a month ago now seems
much more familiar. What we needed,
in some ways, for our collective mental
health, was a catalyst for greater physical socialization, more human contact,
and more meaningful community.
What we’re getting, I fear, is the opposite.

Items of interest
The editors of Phenomenology + Practice
are producing a special issue entitled
“Practices of Phenomenological and Artistic Research.” The prospectus reads that
the aim is to move “beyond traditional
views of the relationships between art and
phenomenology by considering both as
fields of research, or more specifically, as
ways of researching through phenomena.”
The focus is “research practices developed
through the influence, combination or even
hybridization of phenomenological and artistic approaches.” Contacts: info@alexarteaga.ne; emma.cocker@ntu.ac.uk.
The Journal of Civic Architecture is a
peer-reviewed effort presenting creative
work “oriented toward city life.” One focus
is “creative life in the city, in the everyday
world of work and human being….” The
journal is published by London’s Canalside Press. www.canalsidepress.com.
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Citations received
Patrick Lynch, 2017. Civic
Ground: Rhythmic Spatiality
and the Communicative
Movement between Architecture, Sculpture and Site. London: Artifice Books.
This British architect criticizes the conventional modernist comparison of buildings
with sculptures and instead argues for an
understanding grounded in “rhythmic spatiality,” which situates the designed thing
in relation to a shifting physical setting and
civic context. This book is complemented
by an earlier edited collection entitled
Memesis (Artifice Books, 2015); this earlier volume include entries by Lynch, Alexandra Stara, David Grandorge, Peter
Carl, and Laura Evans.

James M. Magrini, 2019. Ethical Responses to Nature’s
Call: Reticent Imperatives.
NY: Taylor & Francis.
This philosopher argues “for a renewed
view of objects and nature” and “considers
how it is possible to understand our ethical
duties—in the form of ethical intuitionalism—to nature and the planet by listening
to and releasing ourselves over to the call
or address of nature.”

Tim Patterson & John Buechsenstein, eds., 2018. Wine
and Place: A Terroir Reader,
Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press.
In studies of “sense of place,” one of the
most intriguing and applicable notions is
the French terroir—the claim that the
unique quality of a particular wine is a
product of its place qualities, including natural (soil, topography, drainage, weather,
and climate) and human aspects (the care
of vineyards and the craft of winemakers).

In this edited collection, a winemaker
(Patternson) and wine educator (Buechsenstein) assemble a wide-ranging set of readings arguing for and against the reality of
terroir. The following sidebar includes the
opening passage from their introduction.

The earthly link in wine
The notion of terrior is at the heart of
what makes wine special. No other
foodstuff, no other agricultural commodity, grips the human imagination
with such immeasurable force as a
great wine from a great growing area.
When you taste a great wine, it
seems inevitable that a connection exists between those inimitable flavors
and the particulars of that place—the
soil, the climate, the elevation, the aspect, the parcel’s unique position on
the hill or in the vale.
No other connection between food
and place has inspired as extensive a
body of literature as the earthly link in
wine. Many agricultural products exhibit some degree of regional and subspecies variation, but since wine involves a dramatic transformation of
raw grapes through fermentation, the
lingering pedigree of origin is all the
more remarkable.
Wine is unique, and terrior is the
reason. The Greeks and Romans had
wine gods; there is no record of any
deity responsible for, say, Vidalia onions, tasty as they are (p. 1).

Christopher Tilley, ed., 2019.
London’s Urban Landscape:
Another Way of Telling. London: Univ. College London
Press.

ronment to the urban landscape.” The emphasis is “phenomenological thinking
[that] presents fine-grained ethnographies
of the practices of everyday life in London.” The ten chapters focus on residential
and public places. Entries include:
“Change and continuity in a central London street” (Ilaria Pulini); “Towards a
phenomenology of the concrete megastructure: Space and perception at the
Brunswick Centre, London” (Clare
Melhuish); “Isolation: A walk through a
London estate” (Dave Yates); “Liminality
and the carnivalesque in Smithfield Antiques Market”; “Holland Park: An elite
London landscape” (Christopher Tilley);
and “Observation and selection: Objects
and meaning in the Bermondsey Antique
Market” (Dave Yates).
The following sidebar highlights selections from Tilley’s Preface.

Another way of telling
This book aims at least partially, and in
an exploratory way, fill two gaps in the
literature: (a) the paucity of thick ethnographic description of place in London; and (b) discussion of the material
significance of the places forming London’s urban landscape in relation to
everyday life. Filling them amounts to
“another way of telling” about the city,
the subtitle of this book….
Each chapter discusses and analyzes
a particular place in the city. The
places discussed … were chosen to
represent a wide a range of different
places as was possible in the scope of a
short book. The individual discussions
range from streets to housing estates to
markets and parks, from living on a
houseboat to the rhythms of a taxi
rank, to the material politics of graffiti
and street art (pp. xiii–xiv).

In the field of anthropology, Christopher
Tilley is perhaps the foremost advocate of
a phenomenological perspective. The
chapters in this volume are said to “stress
the significance of place and the built envi-
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In Memoriam: Keith Critchlow (1923–2020)

A

rchitect and sacred geometer
Keith Critchlow died on
April 8, 2020, in KingstonUpon-Thames, London. He
was 87 years old and a co-founder of the
Temenos Academy, a group focusing on
education in philosophy and the arts in the
light of Eastern and Western sacred traditions.
Critchlow studied at the Summerhill
School and the Royal College of Art.
Originally trained as a classical painter,
he wrote many books on the lived qualities of geometry, including Order in
Space (1969), Islamic Pattern as a Cosmological Art (1976), Time Stands Still
(1979), Islamic Art and Architecture:
System of Geometric Design (1999), and
The Hidden Geometry of Flowers: Living
Rhythms Form and Number (2011; see
sidebars below and next page).
Critchlow’s professional posts included lectureship at London’s Architectural Association School of Architecture
and professorship at London’s Islamic
Art at the Royal College of Art. He
founded the School of Visual Islamic and
Traditional Arts (VITA) in 1984, which
moved from the Royal College of Art to

The Prince Charles’ Institute of Architecture in 1992–1993, where Critchlow was
director of research.
This institute later became the Prince’s
Foundation, within which the School of
Traditional Arts was housed. Critchlow
was a professor emeritus at VITA and
served as director for research. He also
taught at the Prince’s Foundation for the
Built Environment in London.
Critchlow was an expert in sacred architecture and sacred geometry and
founded Kairos, a society which studies
and promotes traditional values of art and
science. Critchlow’s architectural work
included the Krishnamurti Study Centre
in England; the Lindisfarne Chapel in
Crestone, Colorado; and The Sri Sathya
Sai Institute of Higher Medical Sciences
in Puttaparthi, India.
In his memory, we reprint items from
his last major work, The Hidden Geometry of Flowers (2011).
—David Seamon
Below: Examples of flowers with nine, ten,
eleven, and twenty-one petals: “Names are
important but here we wish to focus on other
aspects of the flowers” (p. 185).

The hidden geometry of
flowers
This book, like the flowers themselves, speaks primarily in the language of images. It also follows a
four-layered structure. These can be
called points of view. The first looks
into the tangible structure of flowers,
the second takes account of the social
value flowers have for us. The third
concerns the symbolic or cultural use
of flowers. The fourth celebrates the
inspirational effect flowers have on
us. All four are integral as well as existing within their own separate contexts.
This is not an ‘easy read’ book that
follows a single flow of reasoning
from start to finish. On the contrary, it
is composed of insights as well as
outsights, focusing on how we regard
flowers. It is designed to encourage
all who read it to look at flowers in a
new way. There are also pauses, during which the reader is encouraged to
turn to the nearest flower and contemplate it and hopefully see it anew.
The illustrations are hand-drawn by
the author. Geometry can be considered from at least three viewpoints.
First, as a technical exercise mostly
serving industrialization. Secondly, as
a purely mathematical function.
Thirdly, and most importantly, as a
science of the soul. This has to be performed with the human hand and is
fundamental to a deeper understanding of the Platonic wisdom tradition.
Geometry is only fully understood by
doing it.
None of the ideas here are dogmatic or fixed, but rather an offering
for consideration. We have been
guided ourselves by the truth of flowers, their beauty and what makes them
so important to us—maybe they are
also our teachers of the time-honored
objective truths of number, geometry,
harmony, and wholeness (p. 15).
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On the symmetry of flowers
Symmetry must rank highly as one of
the chief mysteries in [life’s] impulse
for order…. Flowers express a plethora of beautiful symmetries ranging
from the twofold to the manifold. The
most predominant symmetry, particularly in wildflowers, is fivefold ….
There is more than a single way to
measure the geometry of a flower and
its petals. Not only does each petal
have its own characteristic profile and
curvature, but the ensemble of the
petals is what we call the flower. This
collective geometry includes the total
symmetry. [For example, there are]
three-petalled flowers such as the
Snowdrop, the Tulip, the Iris, and the
Lily….
Next, there are some very beautiful
fourfold flowers [such as] the Clematis, the Balloon Flower, and the beautifully fragrant Wallflower…. Next,
we come to the most frequently occurring symmetry in wildflowers: the
fivefold or pentagonal symmetry. The
list is impressive and includes the
original Dog Rose…, the Buttercup,
the Herb Robert, the Periwinkle, Borage, and soon.
Six-ness is found in the Daffodil,
whose flowers fuse into its hexagonal
shaft. [Critchlow goes on to highlight
examples of seven-ness, eight-ness,
nine-ness, ten-ness, eleven-ness,
twelve-ness, and twenty-one-ness—

the last illustrated in the Daisy family]
(pp. 173, 174, 177–78, 181).

The importance of geometry
Geometry is a universal, objective
language and is the study of the order
in space…. This, in turn, brings us to
two most fundamental tools for bringing the laws of geometry into experimental consciousness: these are the
compasses (or dividers) and the
straight edge (or square). They are
likely the most ancient and revered of
all scientific instruments. They embody actualities that can express “absolutes” symbolically and directly.
These two tools guide the human
hand into the realm of objective universality. This is in contrast to what is
called “freehand” drawing, which is
completely subject to the will and
skill of whosoever’s hand holds the
pen or pencil.
“Freehand” work … is totally relevant to the psyche but is of a different
order from expressing and experiencing geometric graphics. The word
“participation” was very popular with
the later Platonic philosophers such as
Proclus, Iamblichus, and Plotinus.
This refers to practices—both theoretical and operative—where the human
concerned becomes the instrument
participating in a higher or superior
intelligence….

The Pythagoreans, we assume, first
posited that education should best be
founded in the four unfoldings of
number. First, pure number becomes
arithmetic; second, number in space is
geometry; third, number in time is
considered to be music or harmony;
fourth, number in space and time becomes astronomy, cosmology, or
spherics.
We advocate that all might “participate” in the art/science of geometry…
We are under the complete guidance
of the movement of the compasses as
well as the rigorousness of following
the discipline of the straight edge (or
ruler). With geometry, we “participate” in the timeless truths of the
products of “straightness” or “roundness.” Socrates affirmed that geometry was the “art of the ever true” (pp.
291–92).

Image, right, above: Critchlow’s drawing of the underlying geometry of the
Forget-Me-Not.
Image, right, below, a photograph of one Forget-Me-Not flower with an
overlay of its underlying geometry. Critchlow writes: “The geometry of this
remarkably proportioned small flower is startling in its conformity to pentagonal symmetry. The centre of this flower is a decagon or ten-pointed
white star. The parallel white extension [Critchlow has drawn in three of
these parallel black lines in the flower’s geometric rendition] can be derived from the central star pentagon” (p.226).
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Book Note
Dermot Moran, 2012. Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology [Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts]. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

O

f all the phenomenological
philosophers writing today,
Dermot Moran, is one of the
most knowledgeable, accessible, and prolific. His Introduction to Phenomenology (Moran 2000) is an approachable overview of the history and
styles of phenomenology and phenomenologists. His article-length introductions
to phenomenology offer direct and understandable venues for newcomers, particularly researchers who are not philosophers (see references below). Two of his
most informative writings are review articles that explore the lived body and habituality in phenomenology founder Edmond Husserl’s writings (Moran 2011,
2014).
In Husserl’s Crisis, a volume in Cambridge University Press’ “introductions to
key philosophical texts,” Moran offers an
“explanatory and critical introduction” to
Husserl’s last work, partly published in
1936 and today “acknowledged as an enduring masterpiece” (p. x). In his introduction, Moran described Crisis as:
A disrupted, partially published and ultimately unfinished project, written when
its author was in his late 70s, struggling
with declining health and suffering under
the adverse political conditions imposed
by the German National Socialist Regime
that had come to power in 1933.
The Crisis is universally recognized as
his most lucidly written, accessible and
engaging published work, aimed at the
general educated reader as an urgent appeal to address the impending crises—
scientific, moral, and existential—of the
age. Husserl is writing with the authority
of a lifetime of practice as a phenomenologist and with a fluidity previously not
found in his tortured prose. There is the
strong sense of a philosopher with a mission, a mission to defend the very relevance of philosophy itself in an era defined both by astonishing scientific and
technological progress and by political
barbarism.

The Crisis is also, undoubtedly, Husserl’s most influential book, continuing to
this day to challenge philosophers reflecting on the meaning of the achievements of
the modern sciences and their transformative impact on human culture and on the
world as a whole. The Crisis of the European Sciences is by any measure, a work
of extraordinary range, depth and intellectual force ( pp. 1–2).
Chapters 1 and 2 of Husserl’s Crisis are
an overview of the philosopher’s life and
writings, including a thorough history of
Crisis’s genesis and publication trajectory. Moran then devotes six chapters to
Crisis’s key themes and arguments, including “Galileo’s revolution and the origins of modern science,” “the crisis in
psychology,” “Husserl on history,” “Husserl’s problematic conception of the lifeworld,” and “phenomenology as transcendental philosophy.”
In his last chapter, Moran discusses the
significance of Crisis today, concluding
that, “even in its incomplete and programmatic form, the Crisis is a remarkable and
visionary work—a work that analyses the
past history of philosophy only in order to
understand its future mission” (p. 297).
Drawn from Moran’s text, the sidebars
below highlight Husserl’s understanding
of phenomenology as philosophy, embodiment, lifeworld, and natural attitude—all crucial concerns for environmental and architectural phenomenology.
References
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology.
London: Routledge.
Moran, D. (2001). Phenomenology. In C. Meister
and J. Beilby, eds. The Routledge companion to
modern Christian thought (pp. 349–363). London: Routledge.
Moran, D. (2005) Edmund Husserl: Founder of phenomenology. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Moran, D. (2008). The phenomenological approach:
An introduction. In Lucas Introna, Fernando Ilharco, and Eric Fay, eds. Phenomenology, organization and technology (pp. 21–41). Lisbon: Universidade Católica Editora.

Moran, D. (2011). Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of habituality and habitus. Journal of the
British Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), 53–76.
Moran, D. (2014). The ego as substrate of habitualities: Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of the
habitual self. Phenomenology and Mind, 6, 26–
47.
Moran, D. (2015). Between vision and touch: From
Husserl to Merleau-Ponty. In R. Kearny and B.
Treanor, eds. Carnal hermeneutics (pp. 214–
234). New York: Fordham Univ. Press.
Moran, D. (2015). Everydayness, historicity and the
world of science: Husserl’s life-world reconsidered. In L. ‘Učník, I. Chvatík, and A. William,
eds. The phenomenological critique of mathematisation and the question of responsibility
(107–132).

On phenomenology
The Crisis claims to offer an introduction to transcendental phenomenology, and, of course, Edmund Husserl
is best known for founding and developing the new science of phenomenology, developing an insight into the
intentionality, or directedness, of conscious experiences that had been proposed by his teacher Franz Brentano
(1838–1917).
Phenomenology, as developed by
Husserl and furthered by his students… and followers… quickly established itself as the dominant philosophical approach on the European
continent in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, phenomenology
continues to hold its own as a movement of international significance,
both within Continental philosophy
and also as a specific outlook and
methodological approach to human
subjectivity in the cognitive and
health sciences.
Phenomenology may be characterized broadly as the descriptive science
of consciously lived experiences and
the objects of those experiences, described precisely in the manner in
which they are experienced (Moran
2012, pp. 3–4).
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On embodiment (Leiblichkeit)
We cannot leave the discussion of
pure psychology without discussing
the theme of lived embodiment, which
is one of Husserl’s great contributions. Despite being framed in the
metaphysical language of the “incarnation (Verkörperung) of souls,” his
thinking about embodiment or
“livedbodiliness” is strikingly original…. (p. 129).
The live body (Leib) is experienced,
as Husserl puts it, as a series of “I
can’s.” I am, as he puts it, an “ego of
abilities or capacities” (Ich der Vermögen) I can turn my head and look
around, moving my eyes, shifting my
upper body. All these bodily movements belong to and enable perception to take place.
The living body is both literally and
figuratively the centre of my experiences and the means of my perceptual
encounter with the world. It is an “organ of perception”; it is experienced
as a living, functioning tool, but one
that, in normal situations, does not
call attention to itself. It becomes obtrusiveness only if something goes
wrong, e.g., I move my head, but my
neck is stiff; I touch something with a
blister on my finger.
All forms of ego-relatedness to the
world are mediated through my body;
even abstract thought (consider Rodin’s sculpture The Thinker). I am always related to things as lifting, carrying, holding, reaching for, standing
back from and so on.
The body is not a passive centre of
experiences but a locus for action and
self-directed movement. In this sense,
the lived body is never absent from
the perceptual field—a point which is
later repeated by Merleau-Ponty….
(p. 130).
This experienced and experiencing
body, Husserl claims, as mediator of
our experienced world, has never
been the proper subject of any science
before phenomenology. Husserl is
surely right there is no one science
that addresses the lived body as experienced—such science would include

all forms of bodily experience, what
Husserl calls somatology in Ideas III.
The anorexic’s peculiar sense of her
own body would have to come into
play here, as well as the experiences
of athletes or dancers.
Empirical psychology, due to its
method, has treated [the lived body]
in an objectivist and piecemeal manner. The manner in which a living
body is spatio-temporally localized
and is involved in a living relationship
with causality differs greatly from the
body understood purely as a physical
entity (p. 131).

On the lifeworld
[Husserl understands the] lifeworld as
a horizontal structure, one that includes contexts, possibilities, temporal distantiations which are intuitively experienced and can never be
objectified in science. Rather than being an extant totality of things, the
lifeworld is actually a “horizon” that
stretches from indefinite past to indefinite future and includes all actualities
and possibilities of experience and
meaningfulness. The lifeworld provides a living context or “world-horizon” (Welthorizont) which precisely
makes humans human.
Natural life is characterized by
Husserl as “mundane” or “worldly.”
For Husserl, as for Heidegger (whose
equivalent concern is “being-in-theworld”), human beings are beings
who essentially live immersed
(Dahinleben) in a world understood
as a vaguely defined context of meaning and action. Heidegger himself
states that it has become commonplace to say that humans require a
“surrounding world” or “environment” (Umwelt), but the deeper ontological meaning of this statement is
not appreciated—to be in a world is
an a priori character of human existence…
Husserl’s version of this claim is to
speak of natural “world-life
(Weltleben), and indeed he characterizes humans as essentially belonging
to the world, as being, in his phrase

“children of the world” (Weltkinder),
a term not used in the Crisis itself but
frequently found in other works… (p.
186).

On the obviousness of lifeworld
and natural attitude
Husserl introduces the natural attitude
as the commonsense outlook of naïve
realism with which humans of all cultures and in all periods of history normally engage with the world. People
live in a distinctly personal and interpersonal social communal world, surrounded by other human beings and
within social, historical and cultural
groupings.
Although this is obvious to the ordinary person in the street, this “obviousness” has in the past not been interrogated by science or by philosophy. Moreover, there are remarkable
features to this supposed “obviousness” or “taken-for-grantedness” of
our social and communal world.
First of all, there is the sense of the
unity of world, its “tendency to concordance” (Einstimmigheit), that is, to
unfold in consistent, harmonious
ways. There is also the sense of horizon, the manner in which all experience… is against a backdrop of co-intended meanings. There is the sense
of a visual and spatial world beyond
what is immediately seen, the sense of
the stability of objects despite the
passing of time, the sense of the continuity of experience and personal identity across time, and so on.
The contemporary positive sciences
assume (with the Kantians) that the
real world is the world of physical
forces, spatio-temporal objects and so
on. But living humans experience a
somewhat different and, for them, no
less real world which has within it
such entities as persons, animals,
tools, works of art, money and so on.
Husserl recognizes that all of these
“senses” or meanings are not just encountered “ready-made” in the world
but are always experienced as already
unified (pp. 273–74).
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Book Note
Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, ed., 2020. The Wonder of Water: Lived Experience, Policy, and
Practice. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
As editor, her aim is to incorporate thinking that highlights “the genuine meaning
of water in its visceral quality, its vitality
and its primordiality.” The volume’s contributors are said to:
move us beyond statistics and calculations, helping us to see water differently
and behave more discerningly in respect
of water.... [M]ight a deeper, embodied
vision of the wonder of water inspire
more throughout policies? Could our
built places be more wisely designed if we
attended to water’s lessons in a more
meaningful way? In recalling the full
depth of the lived experience of water, is
it possible to rethink the meaning of water
ethics, a new and growing field of study
unto itself? (pp. 3–4).

A

s illustrated by her Safeguarding Our Common Future
(2000), philosopher Ingrid
Leman Stefanovic has been a
central figure facilitating research in environmental phenomenology.
In Safeguarding, Stefanovic discussed
ways to allow our world, especially, the
natural world, to become a place sustainable and sustaining for both present and
future generations. Her aim was to point
toward an environmental understanding
that might illuminate the “referential
whole within which we are situated.”
Stefanovic argued that the basis for ethical actions must shift from an emphasis
on “traditional liberal attitudes and selfdetermined concerns of autonomous individuals” to a recognition that, through the
ontological primary of place, “individual
human beings are fundamentally already
emplaced in a complex array of sociocultural, economic, technological, regulatory, and environmental relationships.”
The 12 chapters of WONDERS pinpoint Stefanovic’s ethical and moral concerns in relation to water, the landscapes
of water, and places associated with water, whether river, bay, sea, or otherwise.

Stefanovic organizes the 12 chapters of
the volume in terms of three major parts:
first, the lived experience of water; second, the relationship between water and
places; and, third, rethinking water policy, practice, and ethics.
Part I includes ecologist Stephan Harding’s “Water Gaia: Towards a Scientific
Phenomenology of Water”; pedagogue
Stephen J. Smith’s “Flow Motions
and Kinetic Responsiveness”; philosopher David Abram’s “Creaturely Migrations on a Breathing Planet”; and environmental educator Martin Lee Mueller’s
“When Salmon Are Deemed Superfluous: Reflecting on a Struggle of Stories.”
Part II includes philosopher Janet
Donohoe’s “The Place of Water”; philosopher Irene J. Klaver’s “Engaging the
Water Monster of Amsterdam: Meandering Towards a Fair Urban Riversphere”;
Stefanovic’s “Water and the City: Towards an Ethos of Fluid Urbanism”; and
philosopher Sarah J. King’s “What
We’re Talking about When We’re Talking about Water: Race, Imperial Politics,
and Ruination in Flint, Michigan.”
Part III includes philosopher Bryan
Bannon’s “The Bonding Properties of
Water: Community, Urban River Resto-

ration, and Non-Human Agency”; philosophers Trish Glazebrook and Jeff
Gessas’ “Standing Rock: Water Protectors in a Time of Failed Policy”; philosopher Henry Dicks’ “Phenomenology,
Water Policy, and the Conception of the
Polis”; and philosopher Robert Mugerauer’s “Towards a Complexity Ethics:
Understanding and Action on Behalf of
Lifeworld Well-Being.”
The sidebars below include passages
from Mueller’s article on past and present
situations where salmon have been
deemed “superfluous and in the way of
industry” (p. 58).

Salmon as symbol
The dismantling of the two Elwha
dams [two hydroelectric dams built in
the Pacific Northwest in the 19th century; before their construction, the
Elwha River was one of the few rivers
in the contiguous United States to
house all of the anadromous salmon
and trout species native to the Pacific
Northwest] marks a concrete political act of restoring a landscape, but it
also marks an important symbolic gesture: the dismantling of the
dams has initiated a re-examination of
the various peoples’ complicated relationship with the larger living community, and salmon are increasingly
recognized as being the keystone to
this inter-ethnic work of restoring.
They are being recognized as creatures deeply entangled not only with
the ecology but also with the mind of
the Pacific Rim. Salmon are beings of
flesh, blood, intention, sentience, and
intelligence, but they are also symbolic creatures, totemic beings who
nourish the human imagination with
insights, metaphors, wonder.
The Elwha case symbolizes defiance, determination, and also love for
the strange and exuberant otherness of
the salmon. And it symbolizes a striving to recreate a more complex, recip-
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rocal, integrated, and beautiful relationship between humans and the
more-than-human world.
There, as elsewhere across the Pacific Northwest, people are asking:
What are the needs of the salmon in
these streams? What are the needs of
those rivers, and the many other creatures that depend on salmon flesh for
their lives?
Further: How can the multi-ethnic
groups of humans inside the many
watersheds live in such a way that
they once again become accomplices
of the land, rather than disturbances?
Those are questions one now encounters again and again across
Salmon Nation, and the chorus of defiant and devoted voices who challenge the anthropocentric story is still
swelling to a crescendo (pp. 63–64).

Life wants to live
It bears repeating: Voices that continue thinking of salmon as inconvenient disturbances to industrial development are not uttering inalienable
truths; their claims to legitimacy are
not unchallengeable.
They may—while conflicts still
flare up—co-opt such notions as sustainability or even responsibility but
they cannot, once and for all, contain
the persistent upwelling of wonder in
the encounter with wildness, or blockade the spawning, sprouting, birthing,
and hatching of new life, or obstruct
the instant and intuitive recognition of
kinship between fly fisher and
salmon, or seal the countless ways in
which our breathing bodies still respond alertly, and competently, to the
voices of river, wind, or estuary.

Our mindful bodies are still being
drawn toward, called upon, awakened, stirred, and roused by rainstorm,
solstice, or autumn moon, by moose
or beaver or wolf; still salmon radiate
a particularly vigorous eloquence and
enflame a special kind of awe in us,
charging encounters between our
kinds, now as ever, with [a] profoundly erotic tension....
These are dynamics worth taking
seriously for that which keeps surging
and leaping and running up against
the physical and metaphysical dams
of the human-centered lifeworld is
none other than life itself, raucous,
untamable life, wanting to live.
This may be warning or pledge, depending on where our allegiances lie:
Life will not be contained or owned.
Really, it never has been (pp. 72–73).
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A New Urban Place
Robert Fabian
Fabian is a retired Canadian management and systems consultant. He was the first Chair of Computer Science at York University in
Toronto. In the last several years, he has become deeply involved in downtown Toronto neighborhood planning, especially along Yonge
Street, a major Toronto thoroughfare on which he lives. His first two EAP reports on neighborhood involvement were in the winter 2012
and fall 2013 issues. See his website at: www.fabian.ca. Text © 2020 Robert Fabian. robert@fabian.ca.

T

his is a report on my journey to a
new urban place. Fifty years ago
my wife and I moved to Toronto’s Bloor West neighborhood. It wasn’t all that fancy a neighborhood, at least not back then. The retail strip
along Bloor between High Park and Jane
Streets provided the place that anchored
the neighborhood. That retail strip of several local stores delivered a village retail
presence, offering all the necessities and a
few of the luxuries.
As we approached retirement age, a
downtown condominium augmented by a
country cottage became increasingly attractive and, almost 20 years ago, we
moved to a condo in downtown Toronto located on the edge of the Church Wellesley
neighborhood—Toronto’s first “gay”
hood. The neighborhood was anchored in
the village retail strip located along Church
Street between Dondonald and Alexander
Streets. Again, all the necessities and a few
of the luxuries were offered by smaller local retail stores along that strip of Church.
Fast forward to today. Retail has been
transformed by big-box stores and online
sales. When we moved downtown, there
were five stores offering food along the
Church Street strip. Today, there is one remaining food store, but within walking distance, there are six supermarkets, including a flagship Loblaws located in the old
home of the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey
team. Loblaws is two blocks south of the
old Church Street retail area.
Something similar seems to have happened along the Bloor West retail strip.
The retail strips which provided a central,
natural place for our old and new neighborhoods have faded. They haven’t become
placeless, but they no longer engage residents the same way that the old retail strips
provided such natural defining places for
their neighborhoods and their residents.
Simultaneous with these declining
places, the population of our downtown

neighborhood is skyrocketing. Within just
a few blocks of our condo, there are more
than 20 new residential towers built, going
up, planned, or discussed. These towers
range from a “short” 26 storeys to more
than 80 storeys. A typical floor will have
10 or more residential units. A typical unit
will be home to 1.5 people. In just a few
years, there will be thousands of new residents in our part of Toronto.
Shortly after we moved to Toronto, geographer Edward Relph identified the
placelessness that often accompanies life
in the suburbs or in residential towers [1].
There is now a growing literature on the
human importance of having a neighborhood place that can anchor residents to
where they live and to the communities
which critically define their local social reality.
A lack of place can be felt in our neighborhood today. Add thousands of new residents, and the lack of place will be felt
much more acutely in the future. The heritage folks stridently defend the architectural spaces formerly holding the village
retail that was the heart of many older
neighborhood places. But preserving the
spaces that held village retail isn’t nearly
enough to preserve village retail. Big-box
stores will continue to attract a growing
share of the spending for necessities.
Online sales will continue to undercut the
high margin sales that were so important to
the economic reality behind village retail.
On the other side of Yonge Street from
our condo (in Bay Cloverhill) there is an
interesting opportunity to do something
about local placelessness. There are three
short side streets and a service lane within
a larger block bounded by bus and subway
transit lines. Toronto and other cities have
identified the potential value of what is
called “Shared Space” streets and lanes.
The idea is almost a return to the early days
of the twentieth century when all publicrealm users had equal access to streets,

roads and lanes. We’re calling it a “Living
Urban Block,” with intended pedestrianpriority designation on the side streets and
lanes.

Creative city building
I started my professional life in mathematics. I took great comfort in the universality
of mathematical truth. Mathematical laws
had universal applicability. Things got a bit
muddy as I studied computability in graduate school. That focus led me to computer
science, where the value of computing was
critically dependent on context. There are
few important computing processes universally relevant and valuable. For me,
what followed was a natural transition to
the “real world” of management and systems consulting, where context was key.
In retirement, I started to pay attention to
urban planning. Given that we were living
in downtown Toronto where there are
more tall-building-construction cranes
than any other North American city, this
interest was a natural step. Early on, I was
forced to recognize that there are precious
few universal truths in the behavioral sciences. What was true for undergraduate
students in psychology courses had little
useful relevance for retirees living in
downtown Toronto. That led me to a
recognition of and respect for a phenomenological approach to urban planning. The
need is not urban engineering but creative
city building.
The placelessness challenge of today’s
downtown Toronto is merely an aspect of
a broader concern for social infrastructure
[2]. Toronto does a reasonable job engineering the city’s services infrastructure,
with dozens of departments reviewing new
development proposals. Thus far the city
has not paid much explicit attention to the
changes required in its social infrastructure
to accommodate the thousands of new residents who will be calling downtown
“home.”
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I look back on mathematics’ universal
truths and wish there were similar universal social-infrastructure truths. What will it
take for the thousands of people moving
into the dozens of new residential towers in
my neighborhood to feel that they are part
of a “real” neighborhood and can draw on
the support of their local community? The
absence of old-fashioned “village” retail
places is bound to have an impact. Could a
shared public realm substitute for these retail places and provide the space that enables residents to recognize a defining place
for their neighborhood?
That question and a raft of similar questions cannot have definitive answers. It
would depend on the new and old residents. It would depend on the larger social,
economic, and political climate. It would
depend on the public and private third
spaces that are connected to potential
neighborhood places. It would depend on
the formal and informal events that take
place in the available spaces. And those are
just the initial dependencies that come to
mind.

Making it happen
Urban planning in Toronto (and I suspect
elsewhere as well) moves at a slow and often ponderous pace. There are plans to update Yonge Street, the city’s central northsouth street. In many parts of Toronto’s
downtown, services infrastructure is more
than a century old and needs upgrading. A
major study has begun. Some of the early
ideas have been quite attractive, but it’s
likely to be a decade or more before my local section of Yonge Street is transformed
into a more pedestrian-friendly place. At
that point, all possible sites will be occupied, and there will be virtually no new development opportunities in the area.
A recent master’s professional report by
Berkeley graduate student Sarah Saviskas
provides a useful summary of shared space
or what she calls “pedestrian-priority
streets” [3]. There is a growing recognition

that motor vehicles do not need to automatically be given street priority, especially on
lanes and side streets. Cities throughout the
world are taking steps to regain a balanced
use of pedestrians and vehicles on selected
roadways. Many of these initiatives involve major transit routes, with streetcars
or buses given exclusive use of some of the
roadway. This approach makes transportation sense—the limited public realm can be
more efficiently used by dedicating a portion as exclusively for public transit.
The use of pedestrian-priority streets
considered in Saviskas’ study is different.
Her focus is providing spaces that would
be transformed into meaningful places for
the new neighborhoods being crammed
into downtown Toronto. The old-village
retail model for a meaningful neighborhood place is less and less tenable. Retail
has changed and is changing enough that
successful retail primarily needs a service
rather than a geographic focus. But retail,
especially third-space retail, can play a
meaningful role in the establishment of
neighborhood places linked to pedestrianpriority streets.
There’s a commercially attractive opportunity to integrate shared streets as new
residential towers are completed and
brought to market. Advertising a new development as “a vital part of the new
neighborhood being developed in ...”
should, almost certainly, translate into
faster, higher margin sales and rentals.
Such an advertising push makes sense and
encourages the change in mind set that
might transform shared-space streets into
identifiable neighborhood places.
The time to act is now. Just across Yonge
Street from our condo is a modest mixeduse area bounded by transit routes on all
sides. There are seven new residential towers completed, being constructed, or
planned. Soon there will be no potential
development sites remaining.
Developers generally like the idea of
shared-space streets. The local Downtown

Yonge Business Improvement Area likes
the idea. The central YMCA would love to
see the neighborhood defined by a sharedspace street immediately north of its building and adjacent park. In addition, there are
significant voices in the local urban planning establishment who are active supporters.
The effort will extend over multiple
phases. An initial phase could put in place
temporary indicators of shared-space intent. Perhaps eliminate most of the onstreet parking, square the corners at intersections, and put in place some planned allseason events. These possibilities are similar to how Toronto approached changes in
some of its high-transit-volume streets.
With a demonstrated initial success, plans
could be developed for a permanent conversion of the first side street to pedestrianpriority designation. Initial plans could be
developed for conversion of additional
side streets and lanes.
One “official” step is critical. The city
needs to designate an experienced planner
as the person in charge of this initiative.
Fortunately, there are several planners approaching retirement who would look favorably on such an assignment. There are
reasons to be cautiously optimistic that
such an appointment will be made and that
the neighborhood stakeholders will support the initiative. Conversion of the side
streets will be an important step toward
maintaining the local social infrastructure
in the face of a massive increase in the
number of local residents. It’s what the city
should be doing.

Notes
1. E. Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion, 1976).
2. E. Klinenberg, Palaces for People (NY:
Crown, 2018).
3. S. Saviskas, Taking Back Our Streets,
master’s professional report, Univ. of
Berkeley, 2016.
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T

here is an ambivalence at the
heart of dating.
On one hand, much of the excitement and energy of dating
comes from the fact that one is venturing
into an unknown terrain, hoping to make a
connection with someone unfamiliar,
someone from a different world. Each person here is a kind of alien surface to the
other, exciting in part, no doubt, because
one can imaginatively write whatever one
likes on that blank slate. And this alienness of the other is also a matter of risk, for
the person one connects with may be unpleasant, or, worse, violent; and this danger, too, is no doubt part of the thrill of the
situation—as long as that danger does not
in fact turn into a reality.
On the other hand, the excitement also
comes from the possibility that something
further will come from the date, and a new
relationship will develop. In that future,
those involved will become familiar to one
another, and the interaction will not be a
matter of engaging with what each imaginatively projects on the other but will be a
matter of both parties learning who the
other is in a process of mutual adaptation.
In this case, one does not want the other
simply to be an unresisting “blank slate,”
but to be someone specific—someone who
offers one a new home into which one can
precisely retreat from the demands of constant engagement with an alien world and
a supportive platform from which to venture forth rather than a surface upon which
to project. The other here is more a beacon
than a mystery and harbors a promise rather than a threat.
The ambivalence of dating, then, is that
one’s desire demands that the other be both
alien and familiar, both an open possibility
and a closed actuality, both a thing of the
momentary present and an enduring reality.

Travelling to a foreign place presents a
similar ambivalence. On one hand, the excitement that white American tourists
might feel in crossing from McAllen,
Texas, to Reynosa in Mexico, comes
largely from Reynosa’s reputation as a major site for the drug-trade and the
knowledge (or the imagination) that, indeed, one might be kidnapped, and part of
the pleasure in the activity of visiting is the
relief of getting out again successfully.
Here, it is the dangerous unfamiliarity of
the place that is exciting, and one enjoys
the voyeuristic pleasure of brushing up
against that world while still relying on the
comforting assurance that one can return to
the familiar world of the U.S. On the other
hand, a different American traveler might
well visit Istanbul, not with such voyeuristic intent, but with the hope of encountering a cultural world that is differently oriented and richer than the pre-packaged and
commodified world of the United States—
a world that might broaden one’s horizons
and, indeed, offer one a new home.
There is something honest about the dating situation. The desire associated with
the possibly threatening mystery of the
other is a kind of recognition of the otherness of other people—of the fact, that is,
that they are not the same as oneself. The
desire to engage with that other is a desire
to go beyond one’s home and to have that
breath of outside air breathe life into one’s
world—to make one feel alive.
The engagement with a challenging outside is integral to the very meaning of “living,” and one can feel that one “doesn’t
have a life” in the absence of such outside
stimulation. At the same time, we have a
desire to settle, and the experience of the
other as a repository for one’s hope is a
recognition of the other as harboring the
possibility of, essentially, giving one back
to oneself: of allowing one to feel reconciled with oneself and whole. If we are

only ever exposed to the challenging outside without ever being able to “come in
from the cold,” we are worn down, and we
feel as empty on the inside as we feel impoverished on the outside when we are
without “a life.”
The other with whom we settle allows us
to feel anchored in the world, to have a reality of our own that endures despite whatever happens “outside.” In the ambivalence of dating, then, we see the essential
two-directedness of our engagement with
others: we have a trajectory toward engagement with the outside and a trajectory
toward the establishment of an inside. The
contradictory paths in dating reflect a tension at the heart of our existential condition.
That tension is evident in the situation of
border-crossing as well. In the simple desire to see something different and exotic,
or even in the more extreme situation of
wanting to be close to danger, there is,
again, an honesty to both the recognition
that an other culture is other, and the recognition that there is something satisfying in
seeing a reality beyond the horizon of our
familiar world that does not answer to its
terms.
Whether one is simply enjoying an alluring view or seeking the rush of excitement
that comes from flirting with danger, the
contact with the exotic alien acknowledges
the novelty and difference of the world beyond one’s limits, even as it stays closely
tethered to the reassuring support of the familiar. And yet, the very recognition that
there is a tantalizing world beyond one’s
own can itself, by underlining the limits of
one’s own world, lead one to realize that
one could live otherwise: those others,
though exotic and threatening to oneself,
are not exotic and threatening to themselves; on the contrary, for those others,
their ways are precisely what is familiar.
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Indeed, the strange other, while offering
the momentary pleasure of a fascinating
spectacle, also promisingly invites one to
change one’s own life and live otherwise.
Thus, in the experience of the “threat” of
the other, one is not just feeling the danger
that one might be subjected to violence but
also feeling the allure of giving oneself up
to it and coming to be at home in what was
formerly strange.
Like dating, then, visiting another culture engages the ambivalence in our desire:
we seek to maintain distance from an alien
world that offers us an entertaining spectacle that ultimately reassures us of our sense
of home; simultaneously, we feel the call
to liberate ourselves from the familiar and
become someone new. This, too—this tension between the desire for a reassuring familiarity and the desire for an unpredictable transformation—is a tension at the
heart of our existence.
The heartbeat that keeps the organism
alive has a systolic and a diastolic phase.
The systole is when the heart contracts,
pumping oxygen-rich blood to all the parts
of the body; the diastole is when the heart
relaxes after contraction and allows the return of oxygen-depleted blood for replenishment. Biologically, the human life depends on this heartbeat. Existentially, the
human life depends on the systole and diastole of being exposed and being at home.
We humans need a home, which is both
a physical setting dedicated to our own
needs and a set of human relationships oriented to our wellbeing. “Home” is the
world organized in a way that recognizes
us as uniquely important, the world as intimate and close. Without a home, one has
nothing else and no one other than oneself
alone to establish a sense of one’s reality
and worth, and that is a lonely and arid existence, unsettled and unsettling. Without a
home, the world is overwhelming and unrelenting in its indifference to us.
Home-life on its own can be stifling,
though; as the Buddha says, “house life is
crowded and dusty; going forth is wide
open” (Middle Length Discourses, 1.240).
We need a home, but we also need a world
beyond—the world of the real—that precisely does not relate to us intimately and
recognize us as uniquely important. This is
the world of engagement, the objective
world upon which we work and the public
world within which we earn recognition
for our accomplishments. It is precisely a

world in which we can be someone beyond
who we are for our intimates. The need for
both intimacy and indifference and the
back-and-forth between them is the systole
and diastole of our existential health, our
vitality.
The back-and-forth between intimacy
and indifference presumes the existence of
a border between them, and in dating, as in
politics, it is important to establish borders.
In dating, one is engaging with another and
it is not yet decided whether or not one
wants to go further with that other. Consequently, it is important to be able to say
“no.” Indeed, the desire to develop something further with that other will likely be
dependent upon the experience that that
other precisely respects one’s limits.
In that sense, the development of a further intimate relationship is not an effacing
of borders but a richer reality built from
them. In politics, too, borders reflect the
fact that people in groups, like individuals,
do not all choose to live the same way, and
there is good reason to allow different
groups their integrity. Whether between
people or between cultures, borders precisely reflect the fact that we are different
from each other.
Normally, we live as if our home were
neutral and the “other” were exceptional;
this makes sense, because our home is the
basis of our identity—our basal heart-rate,
so to speak—and so we naturally see the
other from this perspective. In reality,
however, the truth is the opposite of this:
we each become someone precisely by becoming “other”—by differing from the
neutral indifference that recognizes no one.
We become someone by establishing the
border of intimacy that makes it possible to
be someone ourselves and simultaneously
makes it possible for there to be others for
us.
But this border is a way of making the
world our own, an appropriation and settlement within an open reality that could be
lived otherwise. To have a home, then—to
be someone—is something that depends
upon the cooperation both of those with
whom one makes a home through the intimate embracing our unique importance
and of those who are indifferent to us but
who nonetheless respect our borders. Dishonesty in our experience—a dishonesty
encouraged by the very nature of being at
home—is not to recognize the fact that our
home reality, our being someone, is only

supported by the world of others, both intimate and indifferent, who let it be such.
A living organism depends on the existence of a world outside it, a world that the
organism appropriates according to the
needs of its own form of life. In the context
of any life, the outside world is thus necessarily both independently defined and defined in terms of the organism. Something
analogous is true of our human world. The
world outside us—both human and natural—is something in its own right, indifferent to us.
At the same time, there is no escaping
our need to experience the outside world in
terms of our own needs. What we need to
recognize is that that the foreign world we
experience is already defined in relationship to our borders—our appropriative settlement. We need both to respect the independent autonomy of the other life-forms
we encounter and to recognize that the
terms in which we encounter them (and,
likewise, the terms in which they encounter us) are already a reflection of our own
way of establishing borders.
In and of itself, it is not destructive to be
a tourist, any more than it is immoral to
date people casually. Dating is dishonest
and destructive when the independent integrity and autonomy of the person one is
dating is ignored, and that other is treated
only as an object for one’s use.
Analogously, the detached, superficial
perspective on another culture has become
dishonest and destructive when the foreign
culture one encounters is treated as if it
were only an entertaining and fascinating
spectacle, or, worse, as if it were only an
occasion for affirming one’s fantasy of
moral superiority, as happens when the
role of the U.S. in cultivating the drugtrade with Mexico is ignored or when the
history of Christian-European colonialism
in shaping the contemporary reality of
Muslim Asia is ignored.
In these destructive relationships, the
other is treated as if it were only how it appears to one’s home-perspective, and the
formative role one’s own establishing of
borders plays in shaping what is really an
interaction of mutually independent aliens
is ignored.
Healthy dating, though, and likewise
healthy cultural interaction, always holds
within it an openness to the possibility of
something new developing, and that means
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the independent integrity of the other is always alive under the surface, threatening,
so to speak, to give birth to a mutually
transformative process that reveals to each
that that other is in fact one’s “destiny,”
one’s true home.
Both personally and culturally, we need
both to have a site of rest and security—a
home—and to be able to venture forth from
that home into an outside. There is no simple answer to whether approaching the

other—personal or cultural—for a momentary thrill or for an enduring reality is better. Both approaches speak to something
real in our desires. But only to experience
others as exotic mysteries is a problem, as
is only to experience the desirability of being at home.
Any life-form is a reality that maintains
itself in encounter with an other. The
stronger the life-form, the stronger the

other with which it can engage and still be
itself.
The strongest life-form is ultimately the
one that, rather than defensively suppressing the autonomy of the other to shore up
its boundaries, is one for whom its borders
are experienced precisely as the invitation
to be changed and to come to be at home in
what was foreign: the one that finds itself
only in and through that other.

14
DOI:

14

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [2020], No.

An Understanding-Grounded Approach to
Science Education
Stephen Wood
Wood is an independent researcher in phenomenology and the environment. He studied systematic zoology at the University of Cambridge
and has held fellowships in the Theoretical Physics Research Unit at London’s Birbeck College; and at the Nature Institute in Ghent, New
York. Wood’s four earlier EAP essays can be found in spring and summer issues, 2014 and 2016. s.w.wood.88@cantab.net. © 2020
Stephen Wood.
In this essay, I distinguish between two
contrasting approaches to science teaching, which I name knowledge-grounded
and understanding-grounded. In the
knowledge-grounded approach, the student is asked to acquire and to apply
knowledge with little guidance on how
to develop the necessary understanding
to make that knowledge personally real.
In contrast, the understanding-grounded
approach seeks to make knowledge
more personally vivid and meaningful
by bringing the student to an overall understanding of the subject, within which
relevant knowledge is situated and takes
on a deeper, more comprehensive, firstperson significance.
Drawing on British philosopher J.G.
Bennett’s insights into the nature of scientific activity, I illustrate how the understanding-grounded approach appeals
to the four aspects of scientific activity
that Bennett identifies as contact, vision,
knowledge, and technique. For realworld evidence, I draw on my own experiences as a learner, both as a university student and as a member of volunteer naturalist groups.
I argue that, in my fruitful learning experiences, teachers followed an understanding-grounded approach attending
to each of these four aspects. In contrast, my experiences of knowledgegrounded teaching led to
learning outcomes that were
unsatisfactory, at least
partly because the learning
process did not fully incorporate Bennett’s four aspects of scientific activity.
To provide a thematic focus, I reflect on the implications of understandinggrounded and knowledge-

grounded approaches for sustainability
education. I argue that the understanding-grounded approach has the advantage of being more inclusive and less
hierarchical, allowing a greater number
of students to advance toward the
teacher’s own state of expertise.

The method of systematics
To facilitate understanding-grounded
learning, Bennett proposes a method that
he names systematics, which is said to
enable investigators to probe ever more
deeply into the richness of a phenomenon [1]. Systematics facilitates a progressive understanding of the phenomenon through attention to the qualitative
significance of number. For example,
viewing the phenomenon as oneness or
monad, the investigator looks for wholeness, which is the central qualitative
meaning of oneness. As twoness or
dyad, the phenomenon appears as a polarity or a complementarity, and as
threeness or triad, as a relationship and
as a process. Probing the phenomenon
for its fourness, or tetrad, the investigator considers the phenomenon as a pattern of organized activity that has some
sort of intentional outcome. As fiveness
or pentad, the phenomenon appears for

the first time as an entity with a certain
potential and reach in the world. As sixness or hexad, the phenomenon coalesces into a recognizable event in space
and time.
Each of the phenomenon’s qualitative
possibilities—monad, dyad, triad, and
so forth—is identified by Bennett as a
system, which can be defined by the
given number of mutually relevant
terms. The monad consists of a single
term, the totality. In turn, the dyad has
two opposing poles, or natures; the triad,
three impulses; the tetrad, four sources;
the pentad, five limits; and the hexad, six
laws. Bennett describes systems up to
twelve terms and beyond.
As I hope to demonstrate through my
example of science education, systematics has the advantage of bringing hitherto unsuspected aspects of the phenomenon into awareness and highlighting
their mutual relevance. Using the systematics method, investigators consider
the phenomenon in terms of specific systems that may draw attention to particular actions and patterns of interest.
To study the scientific enterprise, for
example, Bennett chooses the tetrad as
particularly appropriate, since science
can be readily recognized as a system of
organized activity with definite aims
and hopes of accomplishment. Each
of the terms of the tetrad—the four
sources—reveals important aspects
of science as a directed activity aiming to achieve specific outcomes.
As a symbol, the tetrad is pictured
by Bennett as the cross-filled diamond of the figure, left. The tetrad’s
four points are its four sources, which
Bennett identified, on the vertical
axis, as ground and goal; and, on the
horizontal axis, as direction and instrument.
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The tetrad of scientific activity is illustrated in the figure, right. Note that Bennett
identifies the two endpoints
of the vertical axis as contact
and vision. As ground of scientific activity, contact refers
to the scientist’s engagement
with the material world,
which is his or her starting
point and presupposes an
“accurate contact with the
thing being studied” [2]. This
situation of contact with the material
world is available to the senses and
measurable, whether directly through
first-hand observation or through second-hand instrumentalist means like telescopes or electronic microscopes.
In turn, vision relates to the scientist’s
aim for a comprehensive theory providing a thorough understanding of how the
world works. This vision of a certain
manner of “truth” elevates science
above the ordinary and gives it enduring
significance and value, a pursuit that
fuels the scientist’s passion and commitment: “Significant scientific activity is
marked by a special kind of wonder and
faith. The scientist must have insight, vision, and a sense of nature’s mystery”
[3].
Next, there are the endpoints of the
tetrad’s horizontal axis, the first of
which is knowledge, which provides research direction for the scientist and a
“guiding intelligence” [4]. Scientific erudition links researchers with past and
future efforts in the field and relates their
ideas and findings to the larger discipline of which they are a part.
The tetrad’s other horizontal endpoint
is technique, which refers to the practical feel scientists have for their field of
research. Technique involves familiarity
gained over long exposure and relates to
the instinctive skills that researchers develop for conducting effective experiments and obtaining a clear account of
phenomena.
Bennett suggests that technique incorporates a field of practical action via
which knowledge becomes actualized
[5]. More broadly, he suggests that
knowledge relates more to an intellectual dimension of scientific endeavor,
while technique relates more to an emotional dimension [6]. He points out how

different scientists have access to the
four sources of scientific activity in
unique ways. He writes:
No scientist’s work is so perfectly balanced that all four sources play an equal
role. Some scientists have a knack for
seeing empirically, while others have the
ability to synthesize research in a field
and to integrate their own work accordingly.
Yet again, some scientists have great
technical skill and a determined persistence to carry their work through, while
others are visionaries who can see
deeply into the principles of nature. Einstein, for example, conducted theoretical
experiments on paper and had little interest in empirical research or practical
techniques. He had a remarkable ability
to integrate scientific knowledge and to
see conceptual patterns hidden from
other scientists [7].

Encounters with nature
Though I grew up in England and did my
doctoral work there, I moved to France
in 2008. Right from the start, I was keen
to find a community of French naturalists. If only there could be a way to engage in practical activities to understand
and to protect nature better. The advisor
helping me with my adjustment to my
new country suggested a wildlife association affiliated with the University of
Montpellier, itself very active in the
ecology and conservation fields. Headquartered in a village not far from Montpellier, this association had taken over
an abandoned farm and had restored it as
a wildlife preserve.
Before making contact, I studied the
association’s website and was inspired
by what I read. The salaried members
described their background, all speaking

of their passion for the outdoors, for
particular plants and animals, as well
as their appreciation of the attitudes of
fellow members, their enthusiasm and
conviction, their humility and imagination. One wrote that he was also a
sculptor. Another described his childhood memory of the soothing movements of the Loire River and feeling
like a pebble rocked back and forth on
the riverbed. Another member proclaimed his conviction that there was
no frontier between humans and nature. It was gratifying to read of people
committed to high intellectual standards
who were also willing to speak openly of
their feelings for the natural world.
My first meeting with the French association, however, came as a great
shock. Sent out to their reclaimed farm,
I was quickly out of my depth. We were
handed a list of plant species covering
fourteen A4 pages and asked to tick off
each species as we identified examples
in the field. The list was a great intellectual achievement: an exhaustive survey
of all plant species found on the abandoned farm. We were expected to contribute to the effort of keeping the list
up-to-date and to learn the particularities
of each species. Too soon, however, this
task became a race to tick off as many
species as quickly as possible.
This task could have been directed so
differently. The more experienced members of the association could have provided an overview of the site’s ecology
and its plant communities and habitats.
These senior members could have then
directed us to a small number of key species and given us time to study them, to
draw them, or to take turns at describing
them. This approach would have helped
us to develop accurate contact with the
plants of the place, to acquire the skills
to study them, and to gain a feel for
them. The list of species would have
started to organize itself into a meaningful pattern, once we started to know
where to look for different types of plant
and to recognize the more common species.
Instead, we were tasked with a cold,
purely intellectual exercise that was a
stark expression of the knowledgegrounded approach, where thinking is
paramount. Despite what association
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members wrote on their website, feelings were to play no part in their daily
practice. For them, reliable knowledge
of nature could only be attained by leaving emotional sensibilities at the door.
More than likely, these feelings had led
members to that door, but once within
the hallowed halls of science, only a professional detachment would allow them
to arrive at defensible conclusions. They
were not interested in a broader understanding of nature to be gained by uniting thinking and feeling. As my PhD supervisor at the Natural History Museum
in London told me, “You’re not here to
understand anything!”
The supposed neutrality of science
can be a reassuring refuge. If knowledge
is the only aim, then we are not to make
value judgments but only report on what
appears to be the case, given the balance
of probabilities. We aim for informative
summaries of the data we have so painstakingly gathered. We conduct the analyses and produce the graphs that our
chosen domain requires. We publish and
go on to collect and analyze more data.
In the face of the climate crisis and the
decline of biodiversity, we can make a
very good career documenting the crisis
as it unfolds.
Reducing science to the accumulation of knowledge relieves scientists of
the burden to act. The Guardian ran an
article that struck an encouraging contrast. It described an attempt to renew
seagrass meadows along the United
Kingdom’s coast and thereby to help reduce greenhouse gases, improve water
quality, and provide valuable nurseries
for commercial fish species. I was struck
by the refreshing candor of one of the
scientists behind the initiative, Richard
Unsworth of Swansea University, for
whom knowledge is a tool in the service
of an overarching vision, namely the
mutual flourishing of humans and nature. He wrote:
As a scientist, and as a father, I could
spend the next 20 years writing awesome
academic papers about seagrass decline
or spend the 20 years doing something
about it. We have a responsibility as scientists to act, as well as report [8].

Telling details leaping out
In my final year studying natural sciences at university, I took a course in
vertebrate morphology and evolution.
The course involved practical sessions
where we studied fossils in the university museum’s collections. I always remember the museum director teaching
us how to look at a fossil of an acanthodian, a kind of early fish. He asked us
simple questions such as “Where is the
front?” or “Where is the top?” Before his
simple questions, I could not make out
anything in the fossil. I made a guess at
where the fish’s nose was and where the
line of its back was traced out in the
rock. Suddenly, telling details leapt out
at me from the rock. I could now see the
body outline and make out the fins, with
a strong spine in front of each, the distinctive characteristic of the acanthodians.
I had a contrasting experience when I
asked a young postdoctoral researcher
for help. I was struggling to identify the
bones of a fossil fish’s shoulder girdle.
He asked me no questions. In a matter of
seconds, he produced a sketch of the fossil annotated with the names of all the
bones. I saw that I had been confused because the cleithrum, a major component
of the shoulder girdle, had in fact broken
into many pieces during fossilization.
On one hand, I was bewildered by how
this researcher had worked that out. On
the other hand, he complained about my
asking him to carry out such a “labelling
exercise” because this was not his role. I
was none the wiser, however, as to how
I could have come to the same conclusions as he.
In great contrast, the museum director
guided us to ask simple questions about
the fossil in front of us. We were able to
help ourselves to understand the fossil
better and make discoveries without detailed guidance. We were given time to
get used to “reading” the fossils and to
make accurate contact with them. He
helped us develop our technique and
skill. I remember his congratulating us at
the end of the term, at the range of vertebrate diversity that we could now comprehend. He reminded us that this
achievement would have been unthinkable when the course began.
For the brilliant postdoctoral researcher, the bones were just there in the

fossil I showed him, but he was unable
to guide me toward the same understanding because he made no place for
showing and discussing—no place for
dialogue. As a student, I needed to be
quick, to need no time to digest, reflect
or ponder to be able to grasp what he was
presenting. There was no process, no
gaining familiarity, no tricks for getting
one’s eye in, and no clues for understanding the peculiarities of this group of
fishes.
This expert conveyed to me his
knowledge, but I was left to my ignorance. I had a similar experience with
another French wildlife association. The
founder was a professional ecologist. He
was helped by a retired engineer who
had made his living at the paper factory
in Beaucaire but had a keen interest in
birds. On a field trip to look for birds of
prey, I remember how the professional
ecologist, while describing a particular
species, commented that there were two
nesting pairs in the neighboring valley.
“How did that help us,” I wondered? On
another occasion, two birds passed us
with a dipping flight. “They’re pipits,”
he said, without explanation. Both times,
he made an impressive, self-centered
display of his knowledge that was not at
all helpful to us learners!
In contrast, the retired engineer would
take us aside and give us simple lessons.
He taught us to recognize the song of the
nightingale (Luscinia megarhynchos)
[9]. I remember how he began to whistle
the bird’s song for us, and a nightingale
responded in kind from the reeds! We
would take turns looking through the
binoculars at a distant group of birds,
and he would point out the species that
we could see. In this way, he helped my
wife see her first swamphen (Porphyrio
porphyrio) on a visit to the Camargue
marshes [10]. In all, he accompanied us
in our learning and helped us to grow in
confidence and understanding.

You must remain critical!
I remember a discussion I had with the
postdoctoral researcher in the university
museum. He told me how a consensus
was emerging for the existence of a previously unrecognized group of fossil
fishes. I was excited. This was in keeping with my vision of what science was
all about: patterns of order emerging
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where before there was only chaos and
confusion.
Seeing my excitement, the postdoctoral researcher chided me, saying that
the jury was still out, and we had to remain critical. I was expressing my vision, but he responded as if I were pretending to knowledge. For him,
knowledge must be tested and evaluated
critically in view of the evidence. My vision, on the other hand, was an intuition—of order in nature—that inspired
me in my pursuit of science. The goal
and ideal of science—vision in Bennett’s tetradic sense—cannot be reduced
to a state of knowledge.
One must also realize that contact with
the material realm being studied may be
distorted by the lens of knowledge in
that cerebral abstractions can interfere
with direct engagement with nature.
Whereas the role of accurate knowledge
in science is easily made explicit, scientists may remain entirely unaware of the
roles of contact, technique, and vision.
Bennett points out how Rutherford
and Faraday had an uncanny contact
with nature and a sense of how to conceive and carry out experiments that
would allow phenomena to reveal themselves [11]. With regard to technique,
chemist and philosopher of science Michael Polanyi emphasized that practical
mastery is often passed on by example,
through apprenticeship. He also highlighted the role of vision in science—the
scientist’s intuition of a fruitful problem
to study or of a possible solution even if
dimly glimpsed. Polanyi explained how
these “hunches” fuel the scientist’s commitment to his subject [12].
The young postdoctoral researcher
had spent years in contact with fossils,
studying them, gaining a feel for their
different peculiarities and developing a
knack for recognizing bone patterns. To
strengthen his technique, he worked patiently through repeated exposure to the
source material. He read widely and developed a thorough knowledge of the
field, not only the anatomy of the different animal groups but also of the process
of fossilization. He clearly had a vision
of science as the movement toward an
ever more accurate picture of nature.
In his own practice, this researcher
drew on all the tetrad’s sources, cultivating a healthy balance among contact,

knowledge, technique, and vision. One
recognized this balance in the depth of
his understanding and expertise. In his
teaching, however, he evaluated my performance with regard only to the
knowledge I displayed.
It is perhaps significant that this judgment was accompanied by an aggressive, competitive tone of voice, as if to
say: “You should know by now what
you’re looking at. You should know this
group of animals. I’m not here to do the
work for you.” His attitude was cold and
demanding, in contrast to the warmth
and patience of the museum director.
This researcher gave me no time for prolonged contact nor time to develop my
skills in looking, drawing and interpreting. He projected no inspiring vision to
motivate me.
If the scientist follows the knowledgegrounded approach in his teaching, it becomes the student’s responsibility to develop strategies to acquire understanding. There will be some students who
have gained the required knowledge outside the lesson who will be able to complete the exercise without the teacher’s
assistance. There will be other students
who have sufficiently developed their
contact, technique and vision to quickly
grasp what is required. These students
will be able to carry out the learning task
asking only a few pertinent questions.
Yet again, there will be students who
need to draw on all four sources to understand the lesson. Since these are not
given explicit attention in a knowledgegrounded approach, these students will
find it difficult to understand and to
complete the learning task.
Following
an
understandinggrounded approach in one’s teaching is
more inclusive. This approach to learning levels the playing field, offering the
opportunity for most students to progress. As clarified by the four terms of
Bennett’s
tetrad,
understandinggrounded learning highlights the role of
craft in science and the journey to expertise, thus diminishing the distance between student and teacher.
In my experience, knowledgegrounded teaching is at times reduced to
nothing more than testing, checking who
already has the resources to complete the
task. Rather than taking students from
where they are and helping them to

move forward in their apprenticeship,
the teacher reminds them of what they
don’t know. The teacher holds on to his
or her position of power and projects an
air of mystique.

Learning and understanding
Understanding-grounded teaching is ultimately more successful and more valuable than knowing-grounded teaching
because there is a direct, empathetic engagement with nature that resonates
with the “wholeness” of human beings.
As educator Stuart Hill insists: “It is important to ask: in what ways can education help us get out of the many messes
we are in? Most current education will
not significantly help us. In fact, it will
result in a perpetuation of the mess, and
most likely add to it” [13]. What styles
of teaching offer a way out of this
“mess” toward a just, sustainable coexistence of humans with each other and
with nature?
In emphasizing the dominance of intellect and cerebral effort, the
knowledge-grounded approach leads to
a style of teaching that is top-down, hierarchical, competitive, and adversarial.
In contrast, the understanding-grounded
approach acknowledges the integral importance of contact, knowledge, technique, and vision. One can hold these
four sources in mind as they each play a
pivotal role in one’s research and teaching. In this emphasis on understanding,
science can involve the whole person,
drawing on sensing, perceiving, thinking, feeling and intuiting.
Cultivating a student’s understanding
requires a style of teaching that is bottom-up, egalitarian, and collaborative.
Knowledge assures that one’s engagement with nature is well informed conceptually. But understanding is only
possible when knowledge is integrated
with technique. Only in this way does
contact with nature ascend toward the
much broader aim of comprehensive
theory attuned to nature’s diversity and
unity.
For Hill, the choice of the best style of
teaching is “profoundly simple.” He
writes:
[E]ducators can be most effective by enabling learners to clarify what they want
to learn, and in supporting them in their
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unique learning journeys. This may involve empathetic, active listening,
providing respectful, constructive feedback, appropriate challenging, facilitating access to relevant information and
resources, mentoring, modelling and
sharing (particularly of enabling stories
from one’s own and other’s experiences,
including from throughout history), acknowledging and celebrating efforts and
achievements… Yes, if we approached
education in this way humans might actually be enabled to become much more
fully human, and who knows what might
happen! [14].
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T

he central question I ask is what
contribution Goethean science
makes to understanding the
wholeness of nature. I contend
that there is something to be known about
the wholeness of nature to which Goethean
science can contribute. I was first introduced to the problem of wholeness by
physicist David Bohm (1917–1992), when
I became one of his post-graduate research
students in the early 1960s (Bohm 1980,
2003; Bortoft 1982). Today, Bohm’s name
is associated with wholeness and quantum
physics but, in fact, this topic was first recognized and explored by physicist Niels
Bohr (1885–1962), who saw that a new
factor in physics—what he called “an indivisible wholeness” and completely absent
in classical physics—arose because of the
indivisibility of the quantum itself.
Bohr was particularly concerned about
the consequences of this indivisibility for
measurement, a problem that led him to
speak of the “unanalyzable wholeness” of
the measuring apparatus and the phenomenon being measured. Faced with this concern, Bohr adopted a somewhat pessimistic
view: Although physicists might be able to
speak of the bare concept, “wholeness,”
this was all they could say. Thus, there was
no possibility of identifying a more adequate, content-filled concept of wholeness
than its “unanalyzability.”
Bohr proposed that wholeness is an irrationality in nature just as the square root of
the number two is an irrationality in mathematics. And just as the incommensurabil-

ity of the length of the diagonal of a triangle with unit sides is accommodated by the
extension of the system of integers and
fractions to “cover” cases that do not fit
into that number system, so Bohr believed
it possible to accommodate the “irrational”
wholeness in quantum physics by an analogous procedure of using the concepts of
classical physics (the only physics he
thought there could be) in a way that would
“cover” wholeness, even though wholeness as such does not fit into that conceptual system.
Here, we reach Bohm’s disagreement
with Bohr: Bohm believed it was possible
to have a content-filled idea of wholeness.
The huge problem was how to do it?

Irreducible quantum wholeness
The irreducible wholeness in quantum
physics is seen dramatically in the case of
interference experiments with a singlephoton light source. There arises the difficulty of thinking of the single photon as
having a definite path as would be the case
if the photon were a classical particle. If we
insist that the photon is a classical particle,
then we find ourselves in the contradictory
position of saying that the single photon
travels simultaneously in both one path and
two paths. How at the same time can something that seems one also seem two? Here,
with a vengeance, we have the irreducible
wholeness of quantum indivisibility. As
physicist Arthur Zajonc (1995, p. 299) explained,
Goethe was right [when he said about
light, “How often do they strive to divide

that which, despite everything, would always remain single and whole?”]. Try
though we may to split light into fundamental atomic pieces, it remains whole to the
end. Our very notion of what it means to be
elementary is challenged. Until now we
have equated smallest with most fundamental. Perhaps for light, at least, the most
fundamental feature is not found in smallness but rather in wholeness.
Completely absent from the world of
classical physics, the irreducible “quantum
wholeness” became even more evident in
the discussions between Einstein and Bohr
that eventually led to the formulation of the
paradox of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen
(EPR) and its later reformulation in Bell’s
inequality theory (which has now received
remarkable experimental confirmation; see
Zajonc 1995). This research made evident
that quantum wholeness cannot be described in terms of independent elements
externally connected.
Quantum “non-locality” (as it is called)
seems to involve “two” objects that are far
apart physically and yet can be connected
instantaneously as if they are not separated
at all. Again, we have a situation where the
language used contradicts what one is trying to say—i.e., we are trying to describe
quantum non-locality in the language of
physical locality.
In the quantum domain, reality cannot be
broken down into independent parts and
hence cannot be analyzed (if we mean by
that word “broken apart and measured”).
At this fundamental level of presence, the
world cannot be thought of as composed of
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independent parts connected together in
some way.
We do, however, continue to think in
terms of parts and whole, largely because
the very form of our language channels our
doing so. Bohm pointed to the fact that the
subject-verb structure assumed by modern
languages tends to emphasize the role of
separate entities acting on other entities, interacting by connections external to those
entities themselves. He stressed how nouns
are the dominant form, whereas earlier languages were often verb-based and therefore did not encourage speakers to think
primarily in terms of separate, localized
entities.
Niels Bohr himself was acutely aware of
the crucial role that language plays in human understanding. In fact, it was a major
source of his epistemological pessimism
regarding quantum theory. As he explained, “We are suspended in language in
such a way that we cannot say what is up
and what is down” (Petersen 1985, p. 302).
Since Bohr assumed we cannot escape
from this situation, he thought that the only
way we could describe the quantum world
was via concepts already available to us—
i.e., the concepts of classical physics.
Hence, we had to learn how to use these
concepts in such a way as to accommodate
“irrational” quantum wholeness without
leading our understanding into contradiction. He mounted a heroic rearguard defense for a situation that he perceived as
impossible.

Seeing wholeness directly
Bohm thought differently and brought attention to the relationship between forms
of language and ways we perceive and
think about the world. It was studying this
relationship that partly led to my working
with British philosopher J.G. Bennett
(1897–1974) on the problem of language
and the perception of wholeness. Bennett
was particularly interested in time, believing that our ordinary language led us into
wrong ways of thinking about temporal
processes (Bennett 1956–1966). In my
work with him, he proposed an experiment
in which we adopted an artificial language
that modified the way we describe simple
actions and events (Bennett, Bortoft, and
Pledge 1965).
The aim was to see how this different
language might modify our perceptions. A
key feature of the experiment was to avoid

introducing what Bennett called “descriptive fictions”—i.e., factors introduced into
descriptions that could not be found in experience. These factors often took the form
of connecting linkages added to what was
given directly in experience—for example,
hypothetical entities functioning as hidden
causal mechanisms. Whereas what was
connected entered directly into experience,
these connections themselves did not because they were postulated speculatively.
The discipline required to describe actions and events, excluding all interpretive
fictions and yet giving a thorough description, seemed to focus our thinking in a
new, unfamiliar way (as well as evoking
states of extreme irritation and exasperation). We began to experience “breakthroughs” into a new kind of perception.
There was a transformation in the mode of
togetherness of the elements. At first, we
saw these elements only as separated from
each other but, over time, we realized they
were connected directly. In other words,
they were connected at the start and, therefore, there was no need to propose some
extra “connection” added on after the fact.
In seeing this mode of togetherness in
this transformative way, we realized that
one can see wholeness directly, where
“seeing” means phenomenological seeing
and not the empiricist’s reduction of seeing
to just sense perception [1]. Although the
context was different, we felt we had begun to learn how to do what Bohr had declared impossible: to see wholeness directly as it is in itself (Bortoft 1971).

Both separation and wholeness
Because nothing extra is added, this experience of transformation in the mode of togetherness can be described as a situation
where “nothing has changed, but everything is different.” When we see that the
connections are intrinsic rather than extrinsic, separation does not suddenly disappear. Rather, we have both together: both
separation and wholeness. The experience
is twofold but not dual.
One can make a parallel with reading.
Consider the three letters “c,” “a,” and “t”
as they appear in the word “cat.” Perceptually, the letters appear as separate, and we
might attempt to overcome this separation
by introducing external linkages as with
“c-a-t.” This device, however, eclipses the
possibility of reading. When we recognize

the meaning “cat,” the letters remain separate but are also connected in a subtler way
than linking them together by introducing
an external connection of hyphens. This
experience of seeing the meaning in complete words (rather than as separated but
connected letters) parallels the experience
of seeing wholeness directly.
Although I didn’t know at the time, this
way of seeing is in tune with Wittgenstein’s “new way of thinking.” What I also
didn’t realize was that the transformation
in Wittgenstein’s philosophy marking his
later extraordinarily creative period was
brought about by his encounter with the
work of Goethe [2]. Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy is concerned with “the understanding that consists in seeing connections,” which for him was a kind of seeing
that did not need explanation because connections are encountered directly. This direct seeing of connections was crucial for
Wittgenstein because he saw this kind of
seeing as understanding so that seeing and
understanding are one, and there is no need
for explanation because it is replaced by
seeing. Wittgenstein emphasized that to
connect two things, we do not need a third
because things connect directly—i.e., they
already stand in connection with one another, and therefore there is no need to introduce some additional connection externally [3].

Discovering Goethe
My first encounter with Goethe came later
and happened, by a stroke of good fortune,
when a friend mentioned a book he thought
I might find interesting—philosopher
Ernst Lehrs’ Man or Matter (Lehrs 1958),
an introduction to Goethe’s way of science.
In reading the book’s fifth chapter, “The
Adventure of Reason,” I suddenly found
myself feeling completely at home. The
limitation that Kant put on the human cognitive capacity to know wholes—“Above
all, it is not given to such a thinking to
think ‘wholes’ in such a way that through
an act of thought alone the single items
contained in them can be conceived as
parts springing from them by necessity”
(Lehrs 1958, p. 82)—reminded me of
Bohr’s strictures on our ability to understand quantum wholeness [4]. But here was
Goethe declaring that he had done in practice the very thing that Kant declared impossible in principle for the human mind to
know [5].
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In his conversation with Schiller, Goethe
had said that “there must certainly be another way altogether [rather than a piecemeal way] that did not treat of nature as divided in pieces, but presented her as working and alive, striving out of the whole into
the parts” (Lehrs 1958, p. 104). Goethe’s
work on the metamorphosis of plants illustrated this movement from the whole into
the parts, rather than aiming to move from
the parts to the whole, in the way it showed
all the different organs up to the stem as
metamorphoses of one and the same plant
organ (Goethe 1790/2009).
As I read Lehrs, it seemed evident to me
that Goethe could see the wholeness in nature directly and, more so, had developed a
set of specific practices that could lead to
this holistic way of seeing. In fact, one of
these methods—exakte sinnliche phantaisie, or “exact sensorial imagination”—was
familiar to me already from working with
Bennett. We had found that the practice of
what we called “visualization” to be extremely valuable for using the mind in a
way allowing us to disengage from the habitual activity of mental associations, a
dominant characteristic of the ordinary,
discursive mind [6].
Besides Goethe’s plant studies, there
was also his work on color (Goethe
1810/1970). Here, his insistence on staying
with the phenomenon and refusing to go
“behind” it by the artifice of introducing
hypothetical concepts or models seemed to
be the aim of my work with Bennett, albeit
our results were far inferior to Goethe’s efforts, which had produced what amounted
to an entirely new way of doing science
(Bortoft 1996; Seamon and Zajonc 1998).
I also immediately made a connection
between Goethe’s work and quantum
physics in that Goethe’s method pointed to
the renouncement not only of classical
models in physics but of all models as
such. This is the positive side of Bohr’s understanding: by insisting that all models be
renounced, he thereby returned physics to
being truly phenomenological—in other
words, returning to the original phenomena
from which physics as a science arose.

Finding phenomenology
Clearly, there was much to learn from Goethe, and I began to explore his work in detail (Bortoft 1985, 1986, 1996, 2012,
2013). At about the same time as I began
this task, Bohm distributed draft versions

of his two papers on the implicate order, in
which he took the hologram as a metaphor
for the kind of wholeness that he saw as a
fundamental new order in physics (Bohm
1980, chaps. 6 and 7). As with Goethe,
here was another instance of going from
the whole to the part. I realized that it
should be possible to use this way of understanding to show how the radically new
direction taken by Goethe was a reversal of
our habitual way of thinking. At the same
time, one could use Goethe’s approach to
illuminate Bohm’s notion of an intrinsically implicate order. I was never able,
however, to interest Bohm in the connection with Goethe, perhaps because he was
not willing to see past scientists’ and philosophers’ typical stereotypical understanding of Goethe’s science.
Also at this time, I discovered phenomenology, which came as a revelation—an
experience of stepping into a different dimension of mind, but one that is there in
front of us all the while, only hidden from
our customary assumptions. The fundamental insight of Husserl’s phenomenology is that we see the necessary structure
of experience—the intrinsic necessity—
and not just the discrete particulars of experience that empiricism assumes. Perception is twofold: simultaneously, an awareness of contingent particulars (just the facts
as such) and perception of necessary structures, connections, and relations among the
facts (the idea as such). Empiricism does
not recognize this complementarity, collapsing the two into one, which it identifies
with sense experience only. The result is
endless confusion—e.g., the notion that
experience itself is incomplete and requires something added by “the mind.”
The key point is that we see directly the
way in which the particulars are necessarily connected. We do not infer the necessary connection by means of intellectual
speculation after seeing. We see the necessary structure directly because to know is
to see—this is Husserl’s fundamental insight and is not a metaphor. While we may
say that seeing the necessary structure in
the facts is analogous to the sensory seeing
of the facts, it would be better to turn the
phrasing around and say that sensory seeing is a particular species of seeing (instead
of being the only real case of seeing, as is
conventionally assumed).
It is the recognition of this integral togetherness of seeing and knowing that

prompted Goethe’s reply to Schiller, who
had said, “That is no experience. That is an
idea.” But Goethe responded, “I am glad to
have ideas without knowing it, and to see
them with my very eyes.”
Looking back via Husserl, we recognize
that Goethe’s statement was an attempt to
express the insight that only came later
with phenomenology—namely, that we
can and do see ideas directly, but that lacking an adequate basis for being able to say
this, Goethe made the mistake of attributing this seeing to sense perception. There
is both a positive and negative here: negative, in that Goethe was mistaken about
knowing being a matter of sense perception; positive, in that he recognized a way
of knowing that is seeing.
In one sense, Goethe was a phenomenologist, and phenomenology is a crucial way
of understanding his work, since it has always been too easy to mistake his efforts
as naïve empiricism, which is not the case
at all. It is his phenomenological way of
seeing that is exemplified to some degree
by his science of color and his work on the
morphology of plants. One finds more recent examples in the work of zoologist
Wolfgang Schad (2019) on the morphology of mammals; and the work of biologist
Craig Holdrege (1998) on seeing animals
whole. There is also the work of ecologist
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998), who examines
the wholeness of landscapes as revealed
through their flora and fauna.

Husserl and Wittgenstein
As my work proceeded, the discovery of an
unsuspected affinity between Husserl’s
phenomenology and Wittgenstein’s later
philosophy was particularly astonishing,
since many commentators claimed that the
two thinkers were philosophical antipodes.
What we realize today, however, is that
both Husserl and Wittgenstein, in different
ways, were working toward the same
recognition: that there is a direct kind of
seeing that understands without explaining—without the need to explain—because this way of understanding is seeing.
For Husserl, to know is to see; this aim
takes the form of seeing the necessary, intrinsic structures of the phenomenon. For
Wittgenstein, there is a way of seeing that
is also a way of understanding, which takes
the form of seeing connections—the inten-
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sive interlinkages wherein things are together directly because they “already stand
in connection with one another.”
In this sense, the differences between
Husserl and Wittgenstein are far less significant than their common ground: an experience of direct seeing likened metaphorically to another dimension of the phenomenon itself. In other words, what at the
start is seen as only “two-dimensional” is
suddenly seen as “three-dimensional” [7].

Affinities
But only with the publication of Ray
Monk’s Wittgenstein biography in 1990
(Monk 1990), did I first learn of the crucial
influence that Goethe had on Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “the understanding
that consists of connections.” Monk claims
that this emphasis on seeing connections
has no precedent in the Western philosophical tradition “unless one finds a place for
Goethe… in that tradition” (Monk 1990, p.
316). In this sense, one might describe the
Goethean way of seeing the wholeness of
nature in the manner of either Husserl or
Wittgenstein. For example, in his perceptive study of the horned mammals, Schad
makes visible what he calls “the awesome
inner logic of the organism” (Schad 1977,
p. 118), which could just as easily be interpreted as seeing the necessary structure or
principle (Husserl) or seeing the “grammar” of intensive connections (Wittgenstein).
Reflecting on the beginnings of my own
interest in the question of wholeness, I realize that the work done by a small group
of us with Bennett in the 1960s was unwittingly an initiation into a wider movement
in modern consciousness. Our stumbling
attempts to learn how to see wholeness directly in things, prepared a doorway for us
to enter into a much more comprehensive
cultural stream than any of us could have
realized at the time. The pathway I have
taken since then reveals certain unexpected
affinities:
▪ Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by
Husserl’s
phenomenology,
which
among other things, shows us the difference between Goethe’s science and the
phenomenalism for which superficially
it can be mistaken;
▪ Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was inspired directly by his encounter with
Goethe’s way of seeing; consequently,

Goethe’s way of seeing is illuminated by
Wittgenstein, just as Wittgenstein’s
“new way of thinking” is illuminated by
Goethean science;
▪ Husserl and Wittgenstein were, each in
his own way, really concerned with the
same kind of seeing; thus, unexpectedly,
one realizes an affinity between two
thinkers long thought to be different in
their ways of understanding.

Toward a science of wholeness
As I hope the above discussion indicates, I
am interested primarily in seeing and understanding wholeness, which necessarily
requires a phenomenological science. My
concern with Goethean science is the extent to which it contributes to this science
of wholeness. In locating Goethe’s contribution to this effort, I begin by considering
his work in the context of the historical development of modern science—a task that
Goethe himself found of considerable interest.
In spite of our shifting understanding of
the nature of science, the “myth” of empiricism continues today to dominate science
education and popular understanding. This
perspective assumes that scientific
knowledge is based directly on the experience of the senses. Empirical observations
and experiments are the grounds upon
which scientific knowledge is built. In this
view, modern science began when human
beings “came to their senses” and no
longer relied on religious or philosophical
speculation.
The history of science, however, does
not support this view. In fact, when we
look at the major scientific developments
from Copernicus to Newton, we find that
what actually unfolded was the opposite:
people “took leave of their senses” in favor
of the mathematical. From the beginning,
modern science elevated the mathematical
above all other aspects of nature. Renaissance scientists like Galileo contended that
the experience of the senses was an illusion
and that reality was to be discovered accurately only by going behind experiential
appearances to discover mathematical relationships, ratios, and harmonies not visible
to the senses directly.
But why should the mathematical be elevated above all other factors with the consequent demotion to secondary status of all
non-mathematical aspects of a phenomenon? There was nothing like this demotion

in medieval science, where mathematical
certainty had its place but was not given
the privileged status of the way to truth.
Furthermore, there was no objective basis
for this demotion in that no one suddenly
“discovered” that reality is only mathematical.
In fact, this emphasis on the mathematical had no “scientific” basis. It was not discovered by science but incorporated into
science. Grounded in the cultural-historical ethos of the time, this mathematical
emphasis points to a free-standing decision
to do science in this way. “Free-standing”
is the crux here, since there is nothing inherent in nature that requires consideration
only in terms of its mathematical aspects.
There is no intrinsic scientific basis for this
mathematical choice. Rather, this choice
works as a precept: this is how science will
be done and specifies what counts as “scientific.” The result is a new organizing
idea that transforms science itself.

The historicity of science
The rejection of the senses and the affirmation of mathematics as the source of truth
arose from the way in which Platonic philosophy was interpreted in the Renaissance
(together with the role of the Sun as representative of God in the visible world and
therefore the center of that world).
This shift in understanding relates to
what historians of science now refer to as
the intrinsic historicity of science: that cultural-historical context enters into the very
form that scientific knowledge takes. This
recognition of an intrinsic historical dimension means that science is not, as is often assumed, a self-founding and self-generating activity with absolute foundations.
Nor does this contextual recognition mean
that scientific knowledge is somehow arbitrary or relative in a subjective sense. What
it does mean is that nature is portrayed in
its mathematical aspect because that aspect
is an integral part of what nature is. But this
way of understanding does not preclude
that there are other ways in which nature
can manifest and thus be.
Once, however, scientists embark on a
research program emphasizing mathematical knowledge, the possibility of understanding nature in other ways is mostly set
aside. At least at first, there was no suggestion that sensory qualities were not real aspects of the world, even if they were not

23
ISSN: 1083-9194

23

Environmental & Architectural Phenomenology, Vol. 31 [2020], No.
considered to be as fundamental as nature’s mathematical dimension.
Over time, however, sensory qualities
were denied any “objective” reality in
themselves and, instead, were taken to be
entirely subjective. Galileo seems to have
first introduced this ontological bifurcation
into physics, and this point of view was
subsequently adopted by others, most notably Descartes. The result was that anything in nature not mathematical (i.e., identifiable via quantity) was assumed to be
“subjective” and thereby excluded. The
eventual result was the impoverishment of
nature [8].

Goethe recognized that this elevation of
the mathematical above other qualities of
nature was unwarranted in that the emphasis had no intrinsic validity. He did not
seek to devalue the mathematical approach
but to restore the distinction between the
sciences and mathematics in situations
where this distinction had become confused, thus distorting a fuller understanding of nature [9].
His major aim was to renew the significance of the so-called “secondary” qualities of the natural world. In his light studies, for example, he took color as a phenomenon in its own right and, by giving attention to the phenomenality of color, he
sought to discover the laws of color phenomenologically. He hoped to locate the
necessary connections that constitute the
“inner logic” of the qualities of color (such
“laws” being the equivalent in a phenomenological science of the quality of color to
the mathematical laws in the quantitative
science of light).
The irony is that, in returning directly to
the phenomenon via firsthand, sensuous
experience, Goethe was doing what many
people assume science does anyway but
which in fact is not done in its mathematical version.

nomenon itself and substituting for the perception of necessity in the phenomenon
what is no more than an external explanation—“external,” that is, as compared to
the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon itself [10].
Goethe directed attention to the phenomenon in two stages. First, he attempted an
active seeing, a way of encountering the
phenomenon considerably different from a
taken-for-granted registering of sense impressions. In active seeing, one works to
reverse the direction of seeing so as to go
from the observer into the observed (rather
than from the observed to the observer,
which is the habitual way in which one
looks and sees).
This effort of active seeing is followed
by what Goethe called exact sensorial imagination, in which one attempts, without
looking, to re-envision the original encounter. The effort is an imaginative but
accurate consciousness of the phenomenon
[11]. Unlike any fanciful imagination that
embroiders the phenomenon and envisions
it as something more or less than it is, the
aim of exact sensorial imagination is to be
as true as possible to the perceived phenomenon. But this is not a static activity as
if the aim were just to achieve an “inner”
picturing of the phenomenon. Because we
attempt to make the imaginative seeing
happen in a way that we do not need to do
with “outer” perception, there begins to be
movement and flexibility in our inner picturing.
It is by this means that consciousness
shifts, and one becomes a participant in the
coming-into-being of the phenomenon rather than an onlooker observing a finished
product. This shift of consciousness—
from static observations to unfolding process—is the key to Goethe’s dynamic way
of seeing. It is this different way of encountering nature that is Goethe’s most valuable potential contribution for deepening
our understanding today [12].

A dynamic way of seeing

Goethe’s prism experiments

Goethe’s method for a science of color can
be specified in one word: attention. He
gives attention to the phenomenon in question and thereby strives to guard against the
introduction of any theoretical factors outside the phenomenon. Such external factors could only have the effect of obscuring
the necessary connections within the phe-

We can get some idea of Goethe’s method
by considering the experience of looking
through a prism at a white rectangle with a
black background. One sees colors at the
rectangle’s horizontal edges: red, orange,
yellow at one edge; violet and light blue at
the other.

Incorporating secondary qualities

When we begin looking, we tend to focus on distinguishing colors. We give attention to the quality of each color and then
try to do for ourselves, via exact sensorial
imagination, what nature provides via direct experience. We visualize the colors at
each edge, seeing them together in the order in which they appear. By making ourselves reproduce the phenomenon we have
seen in our mind’s eye imaginatively, we
become aware of an aspect of the colors
subtler than their separation into “red,”
“orange,” “yellow,” and so forth.
One comes to realize that the colors are
not just juxtaposed externally but belong
together. There is a “belongingness”
among the colors at the two edges not visible in sense experience alone. One can express this quality by calling it “unity without unification” (though perhaps “wholeness” is preferable to “unity” here).
One can recognize this “belongingness”
in Heidegger’s distinction between “belonging together” and “belonging together.” In the former, the “belonging” determines the “together,” whereas in the latter the “together” determines the “belonging.” In the latter case, we may “together”
things that don’t “belong” or simply miss
the way in which things already “belong”
independently of any attempt on our part to
“together” them [13].
In workshops, it happens quite often that
one or two participants spontaneously experience a “movement” in the colors at the
edges. For example, one participant might
say that “the colors seem to grow out of
one another,” or someone else suggests
that “the boundaries of the colors have dissolved, and I feel like I’m ‘swimming’
from one color into another.”
Goethe himself commented that no color
can be considered as stationary [14]. For
participants not coming to this shifting pattern directly, one can provide a “guided”
visualization from white to pale yellow, orange, red, and black, and then the reverse.
Practicing this shifting pattern of visualizing helps to facilitate a flexibility of seeing
[15].
Working with exact sensorial imagination in this dynamic way has the effect of
strengthening the initially weak sense of
the colors belonging together. One result is
that we begin to experience a quality of necessity in the colors. Instead of red, orange,
and yellow experienced as merely contingent—as if the order of these colors were
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just accidental—we experience the order
in the qualities as necessary.
One way to become more aware of this
non-contingent belonging is to visualize an
incorrect color sequence—e.g., red, blue,
yellow. Most participants recognize that
this arrangement simply does not fit: “The
blue popped out when I tried to make it go
between red and yellow. And the blue
makes a separation between the red and
yellow. They no longer seem together”
[16]. It is crucial to our understanding of
Goethe’s way of science that we can come
to have the experience of necessity of the
phenomenon itself. We are familiar with
this requirement in mathematics, to which
it is usually supposed that the intuition of
necessity is restricted.
It is here that Goethe’s way of science
becomes phenomenological instead of being either phenomenal-empirical or hypothetical-speculative. In both the latter situations, one goes outside the phenomenon
to introduce elements of another kind from
outside the domain of color qualities themselves—e.g., wavelengths and their instrumental measurement.
In rephrasing the phenomenon in these
ways, there is no longer any necessity
within the phenomenon. It has been converted into something other than itself.
When we see the necessity, then it is part
of understanding the phenomenon that
there is no need to look beyond it for anything further. This point is very difficult to
explain to anyone who has not yet had the
experience of necessity [17].
A corollary is that, when we have not
reached the experience of necessity, then
we feel impelled to search for some explanation external to the phenomenon. One
recognizes this importance of necessity in
Goethe’s often-quoted remarks:
▪
▪
▪

Let the facts themselves speak for their
theory.
Don’t look for anything behind the
phenomena; they are themselves the
theory.
The greatest achievement would be to
understand that everything factual is
already its own theory [18].

The Urphänomen
There is an awkward point in workshops
on Goethe’s approach to color in which
participants must make a transition from

the experiential investigation to what Goethe called the Urphänomen—the primal or
archetypal phenomenon of color. Goethe
does not mention this transition in “Contributions to Optics” (1792), in which he limits himself to an investigation of the formation of colors at different boundaries
when seen through the prism [19].
The “awkward point” is that the introduction of the primal phenomenon seems
like a discontinuity—a sudden jump in seeing. For sure, the workshop leader can
smooth this transition over as a conjuror
does when he comes to a “gap” in his performance that he covers in a way that spectators don’t notice. But the fact remains
that Goethe does not describe how he came
to his claim regarding the Urphänomen
that “One instance is worth a thousand,
bearing all within itself”—a claim that, in
relation to color, he found in the shifting
colors of the sun and sky [20].
Goethe speaks of this jump from lived
experiences of color to the broader Urphänomen as an aperçu—a sudden moment of insight and understanding. But this
explanation does not tell us how Goethe
came to relate these particular facts—i.e.,
the changing colors of the sun and sky—to
the original prism experiments [21].
This recognition that there must be an
“instance worth a thousand, bearing all
within itself,” indicates that Goethe’s way
of proceeding is phenomenological rather
than empirical. An empirical procedure
would collect many different instances of a
phenomenon and compare them to find
something they had in common. The presence of this commonality would then be
taken to be essential for the occurrence of
the phenomenon. An empirical approach
involves induction—i.e., generalization
arising from many cases.
In a phenomenological approach, in contrast, only one instance is needed to see
what is essential. The difference is that,
phenomenologically, we see the necessary
principle in the facts. We do not infer, deduce, or construct this principle but see it
directly. This is not to say that such seeing
always happens clearly at once. Rather, the
recognition will more likely be achieved
only with difficulty because, in many instances, there will be contingent and accidental factors that obscure what is necessary and essential.
What is needed is an instance in which
these “asides” are reduced to such a degree

that what is necessary and essential—i.e.,
the pure phenomenon—shines forth in seeing. This is the phenomenological grounding for the “One instance worth a thousand,
bearing all within itself.”

Universal and particular together
What we realize in Goethe’s phrasing here
is the emphasis on the universal in the particular. We don’t see the particular as just
an instance of the universal in the way that
a particular triangle is an instance of the
universal “triangle.” Rather, we see the
universal in the particular so that, instead
of being merely an instance of the universal, the particular becomes a “window”
through which we see the universal. Or we
might say that the particular is a “mirror”
in which the universal appears.
This seeing is twofold—i.e., simultaneously universal and particular. Crucially,
however, there is no separation. The universal is twofold but non-dual; it is not “behind” the particular and separate from it.
The philosopher Ernst Cassirer emphasized that, for Goethe, “the particular and
the universal are not only intimately connected but… they interpenetrate one another.” Goethe said that “The universal and
the particular coincide: the particular is the
universal itself appearing under different
conditions.” The mode of consciousness
that sees the universal in the particular is
“inside out” to that which sees the particular as merely an instance of the universal.
In relation to Goethe’s color studies, one
realizes that, via the varying colors of sun
and sky, we see how colors arise from light
and dark alone—the darker colors arising
from light overcoming darkness; the
lighter colors, from darkness overcoming
light. The qualities of the different colors
become intelligible in themselves.
In addition, the order of the colors becomes intelligible, and the quality of necessity is now grounded in the coming into
being of the phenomenon itself—as also
does the experience of the belonging together of the colors, particularly the two
different edge-color phenomena, which are
now seen to belong together as a dynamic
polarity.
Where with the senses we see separateness, we can simultaneously see wholeness—as we now see the wholeness of the
yellow sun and the blue sky, which are otherwise just juxtaposed facts. Where before
there was only contingency, there is now
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necessity grounded in the coming into being of the phenomenon.
This dynamic relationship is seen especially when the “poles” of the two color
edges are brought together and green appears [22]. Now for the first time we have
the colors that Newton described as the
“spectrum of light” and that he took as the
beginning of his investigation. But now,
instead of being just a contingent arrangement of colors, this spectrum is a necessary
whole and intelligible as such. Each color
is intelligible in itself and hence in relation
to the others, in terms of its coming into
being.
Newton wrote about the origin of the
colors seen with the prism, but the socalled “spectrum of light” that he took as
his starting point is a secondarily derived
phenomenon instead of the simple phenomenon he took it to be. He began with
what is in fact already a “finished product”
that he then tried to explain by projecting
the colors back into light, imagining them
already there but not visible until separated
by the action of the prism. Newton’s claim
was that the prism simply brings out what
is already there [23].
Newton’s understanding here reminds
one of the person who, in Rumi’s saying,
tries to “reach the milk by way of the
cheese.” What Newton claims about the
origin of color is like saying that cheese
comes from milk because it is in the milk
already. He no more describes the origin of
color than this saying describes the origin
of cheese.
Goethe, on the other hand, does describe
the origin of color. He shows how the colors are “excited” in the light when conditions are right. When conditions cease, the
colors cease. Instead of starting with a phenomenon that is a “finished product”—the
so-called spectrum of colors—he follows
through the coming into being of this phenomenon. In doing so, he consciously participates in the phenomenon instead of remaining an independent onlooker.

Different movements of thinking
In making this transition from the phenomenon in its finished state to its coming into
being, Goethe ends up where we usually
begin. What he does, in effect, is to go back
“upstream” and “flow down” again to finish where the standard Newtonian explanation begins, a direction of understanding
that simply flows further “downstream”

while giving the illusion that it is returning
to the source by back-projecting the finished product into the origin.
There are two quite different movements
of thinking here. If we cannot transform
from the product into the producing, then
our efforts at explanation can only take us
further away from what we imagine they
take us toward. The result is Goethe’s dynamic mode of consciousness: to follow
the coming into being of the phenomenon
instead of beginning with the phenomenon
in its finished state. This different way of
seeing and thinking may be his most important contribution to our understanding
today.

From the whole into the parts
Goethe’s way of seeing dynamic wholeness is encapsulated in his remark to Schiller that there must be a way of seeing nature that “presented her as working and
alive, striving out of the whole into the
parts”(my emphasis). We notice here a reversal in perception: not from the parts to
the whole, but from the whole into the
parts. The parts are seen within the whole,
instead of seeing the whole arise out of the
parts. This way of seeing nature, “striving
out of the whole into the parts,” is illustrated by Goethe’s own work on the metamorphosis of flowering plants and also in
current Goethean research—e.g., Craig
Holdrege, Mark Riegner, and Wolfgang
Schad’s interest in the wholeness of the animal organism and the organization of
mammals as an organic whole [24].
There are two common misunderstandings of Goethe’s way of seeing the metamorphosis of flowering plants. First, there
is the misunderstanding that what he meant
by metamorphosis is a historical or procreational change—i.e., that one organ
changes directly into a different organ as if,
for example, a petal changes into a stamen.
This misunderstanding has been particularly encouraged by erroneously thinking
about Goethe in Darwinian terms.
The other misunderstanding is to suppose that Goethe thinks of the different organs up the stem—leaf, sepal, petal, stamen—as being formed on the same pattern
according to a common plan. This socalled “ground plan” is imagined to be
what the different organs have in common—their lowest common denominator.
It is supposed that this is what Goethe

means by the Urorgan, a term often translated either as “primal organ” or “archetypal organ” (each of which is misleading
in its own way, the first leading in the direction of Darwinism; the second, in the direction of Platonism). Similarly, when
Goethe talks about the Urpflance, it is supposed that he means what all the many different plants have in common—the group
plan of all plants. Here, again, the terms
“primal plant” and “archetypal plant” are
misleading.
These misinterpretations can be dispelled by looking at what Goethe says
(though he does not always help himself
here) and, on this basis, learning to see the
plant “striving out of the whole into the
parts.” It will help to first consider what
others have said about Goethe before considering what Goethe says himself. At the
start, however, we should note that it is unrealistic to consider Goethe in isolation
from the context of his time, a period when
the search for “archetypal forms” was a
concern of many thinkers. In Germany,
this interest was known as “transcendental
morphology”; in France, “philosophical
anatomy.” This approach extended to all
organisms—for example, the attempt to
find an archetypal form for all vertebrates
(pursued especially by Richard Owen in
England).
Comments made about Goethe, therefore, are typical of what is said of the morphological approach in general. In fact,
Goethe (who coined the term “morphology”) is almost invariably taken as representative of this school of biological
thought, even though his way of thinking
is dynamical throughout and is different
from the more static thinking of others with
whom he is often associated in the search
for archetypal forms in the organic world.

An abstract, reductive unity
Bearing this historical context in mind, the
following are typical examples of the kind
of thing said about Goethe, together with
similar statements about the project of
transcendental anatomy in general and the
contribution of Richard Owen in particular. These examples are taken from books
that happen to be on my shelves [25]:
“Goethe searched for the ideal archetype
of the vegetable world, the general plan
common to all plants.”
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“Goethe perceived the unity of plan or
structure common to whole groups of organic beings.”
“Goethe believed that nature, despite its
diversity, was a manifestation of a single
plan or ‘Idea’. Consequently, it was his object to reveal the underlying unity of nature.”
“Seemingly influenced by Plato’s theory of
Universals, Goethe was transfixed by uniformities and commonalities in nature.”
“The distinguishing characteristic of transcendental anatomy was the presupposition of an Ideal Plan or Type that lay behind the great multiplicity of visible structures in the animal and plant kingdoms.”
“For Owen, … nature’s plan could be
demonstrated … by seeking the underlying
unity beneath the diversity of living forms.
He sought the ‘archetype’ or ground plan
on which all forms of life, or at least the
vertebrates, are modelled. The archetype
was an idealized vision of the simplest form
of living creature, from which the anatomists’ mind had been stripped the specialized organs required by real living beings.”
We can recognize what happens here by
following the movement of thinking that
produces these statements. We realize that
this movement begins with the finished
products, whether organs or organisms.
This manner of thinking begins from a set
of entities taken as given, and from there it
can only go farther “downstream,” abstracting from the entities what is “common.” Thus, by comparing any one organ
or organism with another, this manner of
thinking looks for similarities and rejects
differences, until one can identify one factor as present in every organ or organism
of the set. This factor is then taken as what
the specific individuals all have in common. The result, therefore, is unity in the
multiplicity.
Thus, beginning with a set of given organs or organisms A, B, C … (that organically are “finished products”), we reconstitute them in the form of αA', αB', αC' …,
where α is what is common and where A',
B', C' … comprise all about them that is
different. This reconstitution can be represented in the drawing above, next column
[26].

We come in this way to “unity and multiplicity” by the elimination of difference.
The result is a unity that is abstract and reductive because it abridges multiplicity to
unity and diversity to identity by finding
the respect in which the different “entities”
(organs or organisms) don’t differ at all but
are the same. This is the static unity of selfsameness, generated by a manner of movement—“unity in multiplicity”—that is the
unity of the dead end. I repeat:
“Unity in Multiplicity is the static unity
of self-sameness.”
With this movement of thinking, the “entities” can be anything whatsoever. In the
early “Socratic” dialogues of Plato, for example, they are virtues. The following quotations are some other examples (at least in
the form given to them by modern English
translations). From these phrasings, one
notes that the movement of thinking is to
look for “unity in multiplicity”—a unity in
which all differences are cancelled out,
leaving only what is everywhere the same
[27]:
“What is that common quality, which is the
same in all these cases, and which is called
courage?” (Laches)
“Isn’t it true that in every action piety is
self-identical? … What I urged you to do
was not to tell me about one or two of these
many pious actions but to describe the actual feature that makes all pious actions pious. For you were in agreement, surely,
that it is virtue of a single characteristic…
that all pious things are pious.” (Euthyphro)
“We have discovered a number of virtues
when we were looking for one only. This
single virtue, which permeates each of
them, we cannot find…. What is the character in respect of which they don’t differ
at all, but are all the same?” (Meno)

The idea of unity illustrated by these
quotations is the unity of what is “common.” But the common property that constitutes this unity is not separate from it but
there in the multiplicity. The “unity in multiplicity” is part of the multiplicity of the
given, being in fact a selection from the
contents of the given and is, therefore, not
in any way different or separate from the
many individual entities (organs or organisms). This is what is meant by saying that
“unity in multiplicity” is an abstract unity.
Yet if we look at expressions such as
“the underlying unity beneath the diversity” or “an Ideal Plan or Type that lies beneath the multiplicity,” we realize that the
very form of this phrasing introduces a separation between the unity and the multiplicity, as if the unity had been hypostasized into an abstract object itself. It is as if
the idea of unity as what is common to
many had “solidified” into a mental impression of the common property as an abstract entity and, as such, is separate from
the multiplicity given to experience.
This manner of understanding produces
a “doubling” of the world—an unnecessary duplication that is the source of metaphysics. The implication is always that the
unity “behind” or “underlying” the multiplicity is in some way superior to, or more
fundamental than, the multiplicity itself. In
this way, a two-world theory develops that
incorporates an ontological dualism: The
unity is more real than the multiplicity
even though it is the latter that is the more
immediately visible.
The most influential example is the philosophical tradition of Platonism, which
cannot by any means necessarily be identified with Plato himself in any straightforward way. In Platonism, we encounter the
primary reality of Forms or Ideas over the
reality of visible objects that are secondary.
The relation of the unitary platonic archetype to the multiplicity of sensory objects—e.g., Beauty to the things that are
beautiful—is referred to as “being the one
over many.” Here, the unity is made transcendent and, as Aristotle pointed out, the
result is an unnecessary duplication of the
world of sense objects, since, in its crude
aspect, the reality of Forms or Ideas is
clearly derived from the very sense world
whose true origin the Forms or Ideas are
then back-projected as being.
What we recognize here is the hypostatization of the “unity in multiplicity” to “a
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unity underlying multiplicity,” a situation
of trying to “reach the milk by way of the
cheese,” as a consequence of beginning
from things in their finished state (the
given) and then going farther “downstream” in abstraction, instead of reversing
the movement of thinking so as to catch
things in their coming-into-being and
thereby ending instead of starting with “the
given” [28].

Mathematical thinking
The unity in the manifold phenomenon appears in the form of a “law of nature” in
science, where it also usually takes a mathematical form. Though such laws do not in
fact have the form of “unity in multiplicity,” they are nevertheless most often presented and understood as if they did. In itself, mathematical thinking is intrinsically
dynamical, and its mode of unity is very
different from the static unity of what
things have in common. From the way,
however, that mathematical thinking is
seen afterward—from an awareness of the
“finished product,” which sees only the results of mathematical thinking and not the
dynamics of the thinking itself—it seems
as if the mathematical laws of physics refer
to what phenomena have in common, so
that the unity in the phenomena that they
characterize has the form of “unity in multiplicity.”
Certainly, this is undeniably true of the
way in which science is taught today. Take,
for example, Galileo’s discovery that, for
uniformly accelerated motion, the total distance traversed from the start of the motion
is directly proportional to the square of
time that has elapsed. It is simply supposed
that, by experiment, this law was found to
be the common factor in many instances.
The history of science shows, however,
that this law was not discovered in this way
at all. In fact, the philosophy of science
shows that it couldn’t have been discovered in this way. Certainly, it can be presented afterward (beginning with the “finished product”) as if it had been, and therefore as if the unity in the phenomenon that
this mathematical law represents has the
form of “unity in multiplicity.”
From this external point of view, it does
seem to be the characteristic of mathematical laws of physics that they exclude the
ways in which phenomena differ in favor
of what they have in common. In relation
to Galileo’s discovery just mentioned, this

law is the same for all bodies moving with
uniform acceleration (neglecting air resistance), no matter how they differ in
weight, size, physical nature, or chemical
constitution; where they are on the earth
(or anywhere else); whether or not they are
moving; and so on.
It is with Newton that this idea of the
universality of science really caught hold
of the imagination, and the idea of a unified
science that applies to all natural phenomena begins to have widespread influence,
not only in science but in the entire Western culture [29]. Newton’s first law of motion stipulates that “Every body….”—in
other words, it is true regardless of all differences whatsoever. In fact, the very term
“body” in physics seems to denote a lowest-common-denominator “thing” that has
been stripped of all differences.
But it was really Newton’s law of gravity that captured the imagination and became the very paradigm for the movement
of thinking that finds “unity in multiplicity” or “identity in diversity,” whereby the
common factor within different phenomena comes to be seen as what is “essential,”
whereas the differences come to be seen as
merely “superficial.” How utterly unexpected it was to discover that the proverbial
apple falling from the tree, the moon orbiting the earth, and the planets and comets
circling the Sun (all of which are evidently
so different), nevertheless have something
in common with regard to which they don’t
differ at all but are the same. And then to
“discover” that this pattern applies to all
bodies in the Universe!
We are so accustomed to this line of
knowledge that we not only fail to be surprised but fail to notice the movement of
thinking that it assumes. The point can be
made by seeing this manner of understanding through the eyes of someone from another culture in which it has not become
“second nature” to think in this way. One
example is what Nobel-Laureate physicist
T.D. Lee said when asked about his educational experiences in China before emigrating to America:
Without hesitation, Lee replied that it was
the concept of universality of physical laws
that had struck him most deeply—the idea
that physical laws applied to specific phenomena here on earth, in one’s living room
as well as on Mars, was new and compelling…. [30].

Unity behind multiplicity
In the historical development of science,
the laws of nature have not only been understood as being the “unity in multiplicity” but, more fundamentally, as being the
unity underlying or behind the multiplicity.
This perspective comes directly from the
influence of Neoplatonism on the development of modern science, with its emphasis
on the mathematical, together with the influence of the Christian tradition [31].
What this means is that the mathematical
laws of nature are conceived as separate
from, and acting externally upon, matter in
the manner of the two-world metaphysics
of Platonism. In this picture, it is the mathematical laws that are ontologically more
fundamental. In other words, they act on
matter—i.e., they are not intrinsic to matter
but impose order on what otherwise is
chaos.
Thus, in the fashion of metaphysical dualism, these mathematical laws transcend
the world they act upon and were identified
as being thoughts in the Mind of God, who
was therefore conceived as a divine mathematician with his priest, the physicist, illuminating the mathematical Plan of Creation. Although this identification with God
has now dropped out of science—notwithstanding the tendency of some mathematical physicists from Einstein to Hawking to
resurrect it—the dualism that it entails has
not dropped away.
In some ways, this dualism is even
stronger in contemporary physics than ever
before—for example, the fundamental
equations of a unified field theory are
thought by some physicists to be independent from, and ontologically prior to, the
material universe itself. This claim often
seems strange to laypeople who suppose
that physicists discovered mathematical
laws from an investigation of the intrinsic
properties of matter itself—i.e., these laws
are not beyond matter but essentially part
of it. This puzzlement is reasonable, even
though, if the laws of nature had not been
conceived as being separate from the matter they act upon, and if the intrinsic nature
of matter had had to be understood first,
then more than likely modern Western science would not have developed at all.
Again, a comparison with the Chinese
situation makes this point clear. In traditional Chinese culture, the belief was that
order developed spontaneously in the
world, out of the intrinsic character of the
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things themselves. Thus, the Chinese idea
of law was that it was latent within things
and not imposed from without. Hence,
since everything had its own law, there was
no idea of universal law in the Western
sense. Consequently, the kind of scientific
thinking that developed in China was very
different from modern Western science
[32].
This kind of thinking was subsequently
extended from the physical to the organic
sciences. The idea was to find the morphological laws of organisms, which would be
for biology what the mathematical laws
were for physics. The result would be biology as a properly based science as physics
already was.
As suggested by the quotations I presented earlier, the kind of unity looked for
in morphology was the “unity in multiplicity” formed when the movement of thinking begins with the finished products. As
in the case of physics, however, this assumption did not stop at simply discovering what different organs or organisms had
in common. This “common plan” was very
often made transcendental—i.e., as a unity
underlying or behind the multiplicity. This
archetype was conceived as being separate
from the organs or organisms that it organized, like the mathematical laws of physics. This archetypal understanding could
play the role in biology equivalent to that
played by the laws of physics.

Thinking moving upstream
We have already seen that Goethe is often
associated with this manner of understanding. We will now see, however, that the
movement of his thinking is entirely different—in fact, it moves in the opposite direction. To provide this understanding, we
will follow the same procedure as before
by looking at some of Goethe’s statements.
Once again, it is a matter of following the
movement of thinking grounding these
claims [33]:
“Hypothesis: All is leaf. This simplicity
makes possible the greatest diversity.”
“It has occurred to me that in the organ of
the plant that we ordinarily designate as
leaf the true Proteus is hidden, who can
conceal and reveal himself in all forms.
Forward and backward the plant is only
leaf.”

Nature “produces one part of another and
creates the most varied forms by the modification of one single organ.”
“The process by which one and the same
organ presents itself to us in manifold
forms has been called the metamorphosis
of plants.”
“It is a growing awareness of the Form
with which, again and again, nature plays
and, in playing, brings forth manifold
life.”
“The thought becomes more and more living that it may be possible out of one form
to develop all plant forms.”
In these descriptions, we see nature
“working and alive, striving out of the
whole into the parts” and not just what the
parts have in common externally. Instead
of beginning from the “given” (the finished
organs or organisms) and going farther
“downstream” to abstract what is common,
Goethe’s thinking moves “upstream” and
“flows” down with the coming-into-being
of the phenomenon. Consequently, he ends
with “the given” that, in contrast, is the arbitrary point of departure for modes of
thinking assuming “multiplicity in unity.”
This facilitation of coming-into-being is
the dynamic thinking of the participant
mode of consciousness instead of the static
thinking of onlooker consciousness. What
we see is the dynamical unity of the coming-into-being instead of the static unity of
the finished products. We could say that
this result is the dynamic unity of the living
source instead of the static unity of the
dead end.
This way of seeing turns the one and the
many inside out. Instead of many different
ones that are the same, we now see one that
is becoming itself in many different ways.
What is important to understand is that
each of these different manifestations is the
one itself and not another one—it is other
but not another.
What we have here is self-difference instead of self-sameness, whereby each is the
very same one but differently instead of
each the different ones being the same. If
we follow this movement of thinking, we
begin to see in the mode of consciousness
corresponding to this concrete idea of organic unity instead of the unity of abstraction. This shift is the important step to
make because, otherwise, we cannot see

the dynamical unity of self-difference. We
do not realize how fundamentally different
this situation is from the static unity of selfsameness [34].

Multiplicity in Unity
Following the growth of a plant in imagination is one accessible way to discover
this dynamical movement of thinking [35].
The procedure is the same as in the work
on color: active seeing followed by exact
sensorial imagination [36]. When we practice this method of looking and seeing, we
find that we begin to experience the plant
“striving out of the whole into the parts.”
The idea of the dynamical unity of self-difference forms as a movement in our mind
as if it were the plant itself doing this
movement.
We now have difference within unity rather than a unity that excludes difference.
Furthermore, this mode of “seeing” is concrete rather than abstract. Instead of a
“unity in multiplicity,” we have “multiplicity in unity, which is the unity of the living
source:
“Multiplicity in Unity” is the dynamical
unity of self-difference.
We must be careful here not to think of
“multiplicity in unity” as if it implied that
unity is divided—in which case, it would
not be unity. This error happens if we think
of “multiplicity in unity” in an extensive
sense (as we would think of “unity in multiplicity”). Rather, if the unity is not to be
divided, “multiplicity in unity” must be intensive, a situation that can be understood
via simple examples such as dividing a hologram or propagating a plant by means of
cuttings [37].
For example, we can contrast holograms
and photographs. If we cut a photograph in
two, we have two halves with half its image on each piece. When we cut a hologram in two, however, we have, astonishingly, two holograms with the whole image
on both parts (though those images are
somewhat less clear than the original image). We have divided the hologram materially but, optically, it remains one.
Clearly, there are two holograms materially but, since each is the original whole,
there is, in some sense, one hologram only.
We easily miss what is happening in this
hologram example because of our ingrained habit of thinking in terms of the
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logic of solid bodies. The arithmetic of
wholeness is very different from the arithmetic of bodies. This difference points to
how we must think intensively rather than
extensively: it’s not one and another one
(two) but one and its own other (not two
but one). In the intensive dimension of
wholeness, something can be one and
many at the same time—both same and
other. This situation means that ontology is
“free from the limitation of single-valued
existence” [38].
Perhaps the best we can say is that each
is the very same one and not another one,
but this is not the best we can do because
we can see it in the phenomenological
sense. Comparing the hologram with a
photograph helps to make this point in that,
to achieve the same result photographically, we would have to make a copy of
the original photograph and then there
would be two because the copy is another
one and not the other of the one.

Indivisibility of the whole
This process of hologram division illustrates the mode of unity that I call “multiplicity in unity.” The value of such an example is that it can form a template for
thinking in a new way—in this case, helping us to think intensively instead of extensively. In such cases, however, we must be
careful not to confuse the container with
the content. One way to avoid this difficulty is to use several different examples.
For example, vegetative reproduction by
taking plant cuttings is another illustration
that can help us to see the intensive “multiplicity in unity.” Here, again, we tend to
miss what is happening because our customary thinking is attuned to the external
world of solid bodies. If we divide a fuchsia plant into pieces and grow them all, we
have many new fuchsia, each separate
from the others spatially. Organically,
however, they belong together because
each is the same plant. There is “intensively one” plant organically, but we see
“extensively many” plants that can be
counted physically.
Here, again, we have the indivisibility of
the whole, which can be divided but remains whole. No matter how many plants
we can count, in the intensive dimension of
wholeness there is One plant that is many
but not many ones. What we discover here
is that there is an intensive dimension of

One instead of the extensive dimension of
many ones.
For convenience, we shall adopt the convention of distinguishing the intensive One
from the extensive one by capital and small
letters. Thus “multiplicity in unity” is an
intensive dimension within the One. Neither one nor many but at the same time
both: This is the intensive dimension of
One with the others of itself—“multiplicity
in unity” instead of the extensive dimension of one and another one.
Evidently, this intensive aspect cannot
be mapped onto the bodily world; thus, we
cannot form any sense-based mental picture of it. But we can see it in the phenomenological sense, though it takes practice to
be able to do so, partly because we must set
aside the habit of forming mental pictures
based on the bodily world we encounter
through the senses [39].

Thinking intensively
Admittedly, the holographic and plant illustrations are somewhat static, but they
are only intended to help us think intensively rather than extensively. If we examine Goethe’s statements quoted earlier, we
see that they express a more dynamical
quality. Here we see “multiplicity in unity”
directly as the dynamical unity of self-difference.
At first reading, however, we might miss
the way that it is always the one organ or
organism manifesting different forms of itself. In other words, it is always the same
organ or organism ontologically because
existence is not single-valued in the intensive dimension of One. Some of these
statements might be read in the extensive
manner, in which case the differences
would not be seen intensively as the One’s
differences but extensively as the difference of one organ or organism from another—i.e., existence is now single-valued
so that there are many organs or organisms
with a common factor among them.
What Goethe means, however, by “metamorphosis” is this dynamical unity of
self-difference—the intensive movement
that produces the intensive dimension of
One that is “multiplicity in unity.” This is
how Goethe’s description of the inner activity of imagination should be understood:
When I closed my eyes and lowered my
head, I could imagine a flower in the centre
of my visual sense. Its original form never

stayed for a moment; it unfolded and from
within it new flowers continuously developed with coloured petals and green leaves
[40].
What is important here is that the experience Goethe describes is intrinsically dynamical. It is not one plant followed by another and another with a result that is an
extensive sequence of different plants. Rather, Goethe describes One plant be-ing itself differently [41]. What we must do here
is “to give up thinking in terms of beings
that do and think instead of doings that be”
[42]. This formative doing—the be-ing of
the plant—is the self-producing “forming
itself according to itself” for which Goethe
adopted the term “entelechy.”
Furthermore, since Goethe did not accept a purely representational theory of
knowledge (i.e., a Cartesian/Kantian epistemology), we should try to avoid reading
what he says in the light of a subject-object
dualism. Thus the “movement that takes
place in imagination”—i.e., the effusions
of plants—is not merely subjective but is
in fact the intrinsically dynamical One
plant be-ing itself imaginally instead of
materially.
It is a consequence of the disciplined
practice of imagination that the phenomenon (in this case, the coming-into-being of
the One plant) can form itself imaginatively so that what is being experienced is
literally the self-manifesting of the phenomenon itself and not just a mental representation of it. This seems strange to us
moderns—especially when we conveniently forget about the intractable difficulties with a representational theory of
knowledge.
But hermeneutic philosopher HansGeorg Gadamer reminds us that “this involvement of knowledge in being is the
presupposition of all classical and medieval thought,” which is understood as
“knowledge as an element of being itself
and not primarily as an attitude of the subject” [43]. It is within the context of this
hermeneutic tradition that Goethe’s following remarks are to be understood:
Through the contemplating of an ever-creating nature, we should make ourselves
worthy of conscious participation in her
production.
There is a delicate empiricism that makes
itself utterly identical with the object,
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thereby becoming true theory. But this enhancement of our mental powers belongs
to a highly evolved age.

An undivided wholeness
If we return to Goethe’s work on morphology, we realize what he means when he
suggests that the organs up a plant’s stem
can be perceived in the mode of One organ’s metamorphosing into different
modes of itself, whereupon the visible sequence of organs can then be seen as a
whole movement of which these organs are
simply “snapshots.” There is a reversal of
perception in this way of seeing: The
movement is not made out of the sequence
of organs, but the organs are “made out of”
the movement—for example, physicist
David Bohm’s holomovement, which he
described as “undivided wholeness in
flowing movement” [44].
What is perhaps most important to emphasize here is the way this manner of seeing illustrates the true phenomenological
character of Goethe’s way of science. We
see the discrete particulars and their intrinsic connection with twofold vision [45]. In
this case, the necessary connection is dynamical: It is the whole movement, of
which the individual organs now appear as
arrested stages. There is a single form, but
it is not what the particular organs have in
common and it is not what is “behind” the
appearances. Rather, it is the unity that is
the whole movement whereby the single
form is not static but dynamical. A common form could not generate the movement, whereas here it is the movement that
generates particular forms. As Brady
writes,
Thus the movement is not itself a product
of the forms from which it is detected, but
rather the unity of those forms, from which
unity, any form belonging to the series can
be generated [46].
Furthermore, we can now see why any
form belonging to the series (whether of
leaves only or all organs up the stem) can
be taken as representing all others in the series. Each part is a manifestation of the
whole (“striving out of the whole into the
parts”) so that each member of the series is
the One organ metamorphosing into different modes of itself. Thus, any organ of the
series can function as a concrete symbol

for all others, and the entire series incorporates a dynamical unity of self-difference
that generates an intensive dimension of
One.
This is what Goethe meant when he said
that “All is leaf.” Because of the habit of
thinking in the mode of “unity in multiplicity,” this statement is usually interpreted as
implying somehow a common plan, with
the term “leaf” referring to a kind of generalized image formed by abstraction. If really engaged with Goethe’s meaning, however, we realize that this interpretation is
like trying to fit a square peg into a round
hole.
The reason for this dissonance is now
clear: Goethe thinks of the organs, not as a
set of finished products to be compared
but, rather, as a “coming-into-being” series
produced by the One organ metamorphosing into different modes of itself. The result is that any one mode of this organ can
function as a concrete symbol representing
the entire series thus generated. Alternately, we may say that this diversely metamorphosed organ has no name and moves
through the series in both directions (e.g.,
a stamen is a contracted leaf; or a leaf, an
expanded stamen). Whichever way, what
is important is the dynamical wholeness of
the series of organs and not what members
of the series have in common.

Participating in thinking
The difference between the concrete dynamical wholeness of the series and the abstract common factor of a set was recognized very early on by philosopher Ernst
Cassirer. He saw that, although universal
concepts were traditionally (i.e., in the empirical tradition) supposed to be formed by
the abstraction of a common factor, this
widely held view was intrinsically contradictory because it presupposed the very
concepts the origins of which it sought to
explain.
Cassirer recognized that, more fundamentally, concepts in mathematics and
mathematical science took the form of a series rather than a common factor. Once the
general principle is known, then far from
eliminating differences, it is possible to
generate all the different possibilities. In
other words, the particular cases in their
concrete totality can be evolved from the
concept so that the concept can be said to
include diversity within itself. In short, the
concept is a concrete universal instead of

the abstract universal of the empirical tradition [47].
Although Cassirer does not mention
Goethe directly, it is nevertheless clear that
what he says about the form of universal
concepts is very much in accord with the
way that Goethe understood the dynamical
wholeness of the organism. As Gerry Webster and Brian Goodwin explain, “Cassirer’s important concept of ‘serial form’
seems to have been anticipated, if only intuitively, informally, and obscuring, by
Goethe in his ‘Theory of Metamorphosis’”
[48]. Webster and Goodwin draw on philosopher Ron Brady‘s work to show how
Goethe’s transformation series of organs is
of a similar kind to Cassirer’s concept of
serial form [49].
Though they discuss this link between
Goethe and Cassirer, Webster and Goodwin also indicate how the two thinkers differ in that Cassirer ultimately assumed a
representational theory of understanding
that separates being and knowledge into
different domains, with the latter restricted
to the domain of cognitive representation.
Consequently, Webster and Goodwin see
Goethe’s phenomenology of organic form
as emphasizing only “the epistemic order,
the forms of thought in terms of which being is represented or described—the structure of a set of concepts or propositions—
and not to the forms of being per se, the
ontological order” [50].
To some extent, the tendency to depend
on a representational theory of knowledge
is itself a consequence of failing to incorporate a dynamical mode of consciousness
in scientific thinking. The reductive result
is that thinking remains in the onlooker
mode of consciousness and consequently
too closely tied to things in their finished
state. As a result, the question of
knowledge becomes that of how we can
know things that have already become with
the result that the subject-object dualism of
representational theory seems quite “natural.”
In contrast, a dynamical mode of consciousness invokes a participation in
“thinking the coming-into-being of things”
and encountering generatively what otherwise we would only know as a completed
product. In Goethe’s manner of seeing, the
coming-into-being of the phenomenon
forms itself in thinking so that the dynamical mode of understanding is no longer divorced from the phenomenon. Knowledge
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is no longer apart from being because
knowledge is the phenomenon be-ing itself
through thinking. Understanding becomes
a part of being itself.

The whole entering into each part
When we are able to encounter nature
“working and alive, striving out of the
whole into the parts,” we come to see the
whole reflected in the part because the part
is an expression of the whole—literally a
part-ial expression. When we look in this
way, we really see the unity of nature as
the dynamical unity of self-difference and,
hence, in the mode of the intensive dimension of One. It is especially characteristic
of what is living that, in philosopher Ron
Brady’s succinct phrase, “It is becoming
other in order to remain itself” (Brady
1987, p. 286).
Anyone can practice this way of seeing.
For example, one can see a particular family of plants in its organic mode. It is an
enlivening experience to observe the different members of a family such as the
Rosaceae (rose, blackberry, strawberry,
apple, and so forth) and realize they are
One plant in the form of “multiplicity in
unity.” How different this experience is
from that of looking for what these different plants have in common!

A Phenomenology of mammals
Though Goethe’s way of seeing works satisfactorily with plants, one finds it intensified when looking at animals. Here, we
turn to the extraordinary work of biologist
Wolfgang Schad (2019) and ecologists
Craig Holdrege (1998, 2003, 2009) and
Mark Riegner (1993, 1998, 2008, 2013).
Their research provides some of the best
examples of the phenomenology of nature
that we yet have. This work is rooted in a
Goethean approach yet developed and presented with only minimal reference to
Goethe. This distancing is important if
phenomenological research on the wholeness of nature is to develop into a real science. What is not needed is making Goethe
into some sort of romantic scientific hero,
battling against mainstream Western science.
All the themes I have discussed here are
exemplified in these animal studies when
seen in the light of “multiplicity in unity”
rather than “unity in multiplicity.” Schad’s
book works as a “template” for thinking in

a new way. His perceptive, readily understandable examples facilitate a new movement of thinking. As one studies the book,
he or she is astonished to see the wholeness
of nature emerge in such a natural way that
it seems as if it is there “in front of our very
eyes” (but of course it is not).
Schad’s way of seeing is so clear that
I’m convinced it makes a far better introduction to a Goethean phenomenology of
nature than Goethe’s work on color that
more often gets phenomenological attention [51]. When we see nature “striving out
of the whole into the parts,” via Schad’s
example of mammals, we see in a way that
is “inside out” to what is usual. We see
how the whole enters into each part, which
is therefore a part-ial expression of the
whole.
This way of seeing naturally leads to a
dynamical classification of the mammals
instead of the static “pigeonhole” classifications with which we are more familiar.
The difference between a thinking arising
from a “coming into being” and a thinking
arising from a “finished product” is experienced vividly in Schad’s account, which
leads us to discover intrinsic relationships
among mammals that otherwise would not
be recognized. As Schad explains,
Here, we witness the awesome inner logic
of the organism and experience a diversity
ordered in a living way and not merely
schematized (Schad 2019, p. 4).
In Schad’s understanding of mammals, we
see the phenomenological science of nature clearly—i.e., that it is phenomenological in Husserl’s sense because it returns to
“the things themselves.” Schad’s work on
animal wholeness also exemplifies Wittgenstein’s new kind of understanding (replacing explanation) that consists in seeing
relationships—i.e., recognizing the way
whereby things (in this case, mammals)
“already stand in connection with one another” (the “grammar” of the mammals)
[52].

Intrinsic relationships
The phenomenologist of nature sees the intrinsic relationships and necessary structures that, otherwise, would appear only
externally as contingent facts. Holdrege’s
research on the “whole organism” begins
with Goethe’s remark that “Every creature

has its own reason to be.” This phrase describes precisely what a phenomenological
science of wholeness is about: giving attention to seeing the “idea” of the organism
(in the same sense that we say, in practical
life, “I’ve got the idea of it now”). In a similar way, Husserl used the term essence
(Wesen) by which he meant not something
hidden behind the appearances or some
supposed inner core but the characteristic
way of being of something that presents itself directly in experience.
This is what Holdrege (2009) does so
beautifully in his work on the sloth. He
shows how the characteristic way of this
creature’s being reveals itself through a
range of manifestations so that “Every detail can begin to speak ‘sloth’.”
Phenomenology does not try to explain
but to understand. It tries to catch sight of
the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon (“its own reason to be”) instead of
leaving the phenomenon and thereby explaining it by means of something outside
itself. When we begin to see the whole animal, then each of its details is seen to be
consistent with the characteristic way of
that animal’s being.
For example, we see this characteristic
way of being in the giraffe, a mammal that
cannot be considered in isolation from
other mammals if we are to come to experience the being-what-it-is. In other words,
the giraffe must be seen in the context of
all the other mammals within the order of
ungulates. The most striking feature of the
giraffe—its long neck—becomes intrinsically intelligible when one realizes that:
The tendency [of ungulates] towards elongation is carried to an extreme in a very
particular way in the giraffe, which does
not merely have a long neck. Rather, this
length is mirrored in the formation of the
rest of its body, especially in its very long
legs (Schad 2019, p. 667).
When the wholeness of the giraffe is
seen, every detail begins to speak “giraffe.” The long neck is now no longer seen
as a contingent feature, an accidental development resulting from random variation
and natural selection but as a necessary expression of the characteristic way of being
that is the giraffe. This “elongation” is consistent with all the other necessary manifestations of the giraffe’s “being-what-itis” so that one recognizes a coherent whole
in which no detail is contingent. No longer
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is any creature just a bundle of accidental
developments as claimed by current genocentric biology.
It is a consequence of the way that modern biology developed that the organism as
such has disappeared to be replaced by
genes as the fundamental units of life [53].
As a counter to this reductive, genetic view
of organism, an alternative “organo-centric” biology—i.e., a biology of the whole
organism—cannot possibly be overestimated. Even without considering the genetic factor, the conventional tendency
among biologists is to see organisms in a
mechanical fashion—i.e., as an aggregate
of parts rather than an organism-as-whole.
One example is Holdrege’s study of the
cow (Holdrege 2004, ch. 4), which demonstrates how the isolation of a single factor—milk production—leads to unhealthy
practices that would be ended immediately
if we saw the organism as a whole and not
just an aggregate of traits and functions.
When the organism is seen as no more than
an aggregate of bits, then it seems quite
natural, now that biotechnology is available, to simply change one part of the creature, independently of other parts. With genetic engineering, this piecemeal manipulation of organisms is commonplace. As
Holdrege (1998, p. 230) concludes:
In this respect, the ignorance of the life of
organisms in our day is staggering, and
Goethe’s approach is needed more than
ever.
One of the most significant values of
Goethean science is countering this reductive, piecemeal approach to the natural
world, particularly as one might facilitate
research and education in Goethean phenomenology.

Appearance and being together
By facilitating a “coming-into-being” rather than assuming a finished product,
Goethe avoided a metaphysical dualism
without falling into the flatland of positivism. He avoided separating being and appearance, where being is “behind” the appearance, without reducing everything to
“merely” appearance. Instead, appearance
is the manifestation of being [54].
Goethe’s dynamical mode of consciousness is in tune with a development in thinking that has gradually developed over the
last 200 years. There has been a shift away

from thinking in terms of static endpoints.
There has been a shift toward thinking in
terms of coming-into-being.
This dynamical mode of understanding
is illustrated in quantum physics, which
has moved away from thinking in terms of
entities in their finished state. One example
is the development of so-called “elementary particle” physics, which provides an
exceptional illustration of the need to think
in a dynamical, transformative way. Physicist Werner Heisenberg never tired of
pointing out that there really are no elementary particles comprising the ultimate
building blocks of the universe or the ultimate constituents of matter. He maintained
that our familiar language of “division”
and “consists of” is highly inappropriate
and obstructs our understanding of the remarkable processes actually taking place.
Experiments with high-energy machines
do not show the fragmentation of matter
but, rather, its dynamical unity. All the different “particles” that appear are in fact
mutable forms of one another and self-differing forms in which energy-matter can
appear.
What is observed in these revealing experiments should be seen in the manner of
the dynamical unity of self-difference, producing “multiplicity in unity”—i.e., a
mode of the intensive dimension of One.
Instead of fragmentation, there is unity, albeit in a form that we weren’t expecting
and therefore overlooked at first. On the
other hand, when we say that such experiments are revealing the fundamental building blocks of matter, we project our thinking backward and see the situation back-tofront. In other words, we lose sight of the
formative processes and only see instead
the finished products—yet another instance of trying to reach the milk by way
of the cheese [55].

A dynamic phenomenology
Instances of this dynamical way of
thinking are not confined to science alone.
In various ways, this approach is a hallmark of some of the major movements in
twentieth-century philosophy, especially
in the case of phenomenology.
The shift of attention from what Husserl
called “the natural attitude” to seeing the
taken-for-grantedness of that natural attitude has the effect that we catch (but not
catch hold of) “the world” coming into be-

ing. We then see how “the world” is constituted in experience, whereas, in the natural attitude, we begin at the end with the
world as independent object (what is
“given”) and then try to explain experience
in terms of the world (instead of understanding the way that the world is constituted in experience).
Beginning at the end, we ask how our experience “in here” is related to the world
“out there.” Thus, we begin with the separation of subject from object, whereas in
phenomenological seeing, we catch the
coming into being of this separation. We
realize that any representational theory of
knowledge based on this subject-object
separation ends in a cul de sac because it
starts from the end and therefore gets
things “back-to-front.” Any representational theory of knowledge is another case
of milk and cheese.
A particularly good example of the dynamical mode of thinking typical of phenomenology is provided by Gadamer’s understanding of hermeneutics, which begins
with the coming into being of meaning in
the event of understanding (rather than beginning with meaning as a finished product
in the author’s mind). By following the
coming into being of meaning in the event
of understanding, we discover that this experience takes the form of the dynamical
unity of self-difference. When we see the
way that Gadamer’s hermeneutics illustrates the dynamical unity of self-difference, we find the closeness to Goethe’s organics quite astonishing!

Modes of counterfeit wholeness
I end by emphasizing that the science of
wholeness can take two counterfeit forms,
the first of which is systems thinking,
which ranges from Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s “general systems theory” (Bertalanffy 1968) to Ervin Laszlo’s “evolutionary systems theory” (Laszlo 1987).
Whatever its specific formulation, systems
thinking claims to be a science of wholeness. These formulations are a “mechanistic” counterfeit in the sense that, no matter
how sophisticated, they ultimately fail to
escape from the mechanistic paradigm
they claim to counter—the so-called “Cartesian” or “Newtonian paradigm.”
One key problem with systems thinking
is that it sees things in isolation from one
another and therefore ignores the ways in
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which things already belong together. Unaware of this intrinsic
relationality, these theorists arbitrarily identify parts that are
not really of the whole because
they don’t belong [56].
Holism is the second counterfeit form of a science of wholeness. In contrast to systems theory, holism overreaches the
whole in that, whatever form it
takes, this manner of understanding always turns wholeness
into something metaphysical.
Often irrational, mystical, and
pseudo-spiritual, this manner of
holistic thinking typically rejects science and has too often
been used as a front for prejudice and domination, the most egregious
example being Germany’s National Socialism. Too often Goethe has been unfairly associated with holism, as in the
“Goethe against Newton” syndrome. This
association has done much to harm Goethe’s remarkable contribution to the evolution of scientific thinking.
I summarize the three contrasting approaches to wholeness via the diagram
above. Note that in both counterfeit versions, the movement of understanding is
away from the phenomenon as that phenomenon is in itself. In contrast, Goethe’s
approach moves into the parts as they illuminate the whole. An authentic science of
wholeness as exemplified by Goethe’s
phenomenological approach should today
interest all individuals who aim to avoid
the pitfalls of intellectualism, on one hand,
and mystical pseudo-science, on the other.
Notes
1. At the time, because we were not aware of the
phenomenological perspective, we were not able to
make this distinction between seeing directly and seeing reduced to sense perceptions.
2. And at the time, I knew nothing of Goethe either.
3. During the time I worked with Bennett, we were
influenced by Wittgenstein in the approach we took
toward language, but his influence was mostly limited
to our emphasizing the ways in which language can
“sleepwalk” us into using concepts inappropriate for
a given situation, leading one into confusion that he
or she then mistakes for some difficulty in the situation itself—for example, a “problem” to be “solved.”
This alternative way of seeing was very much “in the
air” in Britain in the 1960s, but we were unaware of
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on a new kind of seeing—
i.e., an understanding that sees connections and thus
removes any need for explanation.
4. These strictures might have been because Bohr
had absorbed the Kantian attitude.

5. Kant’s motivation here may well have been that
he hoped to save Newtonian mathematical physics
not only from the skepticism of Humean empiricism
but also from the claims of Swedenborgian “spirit
seeing,” which for Kant posed an equal threat to what
he saw as the greatest achievement of human
knowledge—mathematical physics.
6. The capacity to form mental images intentionally was crucial for Bennett, and he sometimes called
the practice by the German word vorstellung.
7. At a 1986 seminar at London’s Goethe Institute,
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer declared that
“Wittgenstein has the same kind of phenomenological
imagination as Husserl.” Philosopher John Heaton
told me that people in Vienna who knew Wittgenstein
in the 1930s said that he was really doing phenomenology (and this at a time when, according to the
standard Wittgenstein narrative, he was a logical positivist!).
8. There are no grounds for this way of understanding nature other than the elevation of the mathematical, for which, in turn, there are no grounds other than
cultural-historical context. This situation did not stop
thinkers from trying to offer foundations, but the key
point is that there is no intrinsic scientific foundation.
Descartes made the most notable effort to provide this
foundation by arguing that the new science of mathematical physics was grounded both ontologically and
methodologically in God. For further discussion, see
Bortoft 1996, chaps. 1–3.
9. Note the two following passages from Goethe:
An important task: to banish mathematical-philosophical theories from those areas of physical science
where they impede rather than advance knowledge,
those areas where a one-sided development in modern scientific education has made such perverse use
of them.
I can receive mathematics as the most sublime and
useful science, so long as they are applied in their
proper place; but I cannot commend the misuse of
them in matters which do not belong to their sphere,
and in which, noble science as they are, they seem to
be mere nonsense. As if, forsooth! Things only exist
when they can be mathematically demonstrated. It
would be foolish for a man not to believe his mistress’
love because she could not prove it to him mathematically. She can mathematically prove her dowry, but
not her love!

10. For a discussion of how this approach differed
from Newton’s work on light and color, see Bortoft
1996, pp. 205–07; pp. 223–26. Also see Bortoft 1971,
1982, 1985, 1986, 2012, 2013.
11. Exact sensorial imagination is often misleadingly described as producing a mental image in consciousness, whereas phenomenologically it is not a
content of consciousness but a mode of consciousness
and a special kind of intentionality.
12. Hjalmar Hegge (1987) identified the practice
of exact sensorial imagination as the means by which
necessary connections can be seen within the domain
of qualities. Mastering Goethe’s method of seeing and
understanding amounts to a way of developing the
mode of consciousness needed for Goethe’s way of
science. In other words, the activity of Goethean science is an educational activity. It is the education of a
mode of consciousness.
13. For a thorough explication of “belonging together” versus “belonging together,” see Bortoft,
1996, pp. 3–26; 290–320.
14. See Theory of Colours, ⁋ 772 (Goethe 1970).
15. Older workshop participants sometimes have
more difficulty with exact sensorial imagination, perhaps because the capacity atrophies through lack of
use. But it can be restored given time.
16. Biologist Brian Goodwin first suggested this
effort to visualize a wrong color sequence.
17. The awkwardness is that we usually don’t recognize that we were experiencing the order as contingent and accidental until after we have begun to experience the quality of necessity—a situation that
makes describing this difference difficult.
18. One thinks of related comments by Wittgenstein: “A phenomenon isn’t a symptom of something
else. It is the reality” (Wittgenstein 1953, section
126). Or “Since everything lies open to view, there is
nothing to explain” (Wittgenstein 1964, p. 283).
19. Goethe understood the Urphänomen of color to
be the tension between light and darkness—what he
described poetically as “colors as the deeds and sufferings of light.” Lightness overcome by darkness
leads to the lighter colors of yellow, orange, and red,
while darkness overcome by lightness leads to the
darker colors of blue and indigo. Goethe argued that,
in nature, the Urphänomen could be seen in the sun’s
shifting color—from yellow at midday to orange and
red while setting; or in mountain ridges receding in
the distance, with nearer ridges indigo and farther
ridges blue. Goethe understood the blue of the sky as
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the lightness of the atmosphere in front of the darkness of outer space.
20. See note 19.
21. My guess is he found the idea of the Urphänomen in a book. This determination is not unusual—
Copernicus, for example, explained that he found the
idea for the heliocentric universe in ancient books. In
this sense, it is not what one finds but what he or she
does with it that counts. We know that Goethe researched thoroughly the history of color, and he may
well have found his “One instance worth a thousand,
bearing all within itself” in the writings of the Renaissance painters—Leonardo da Vinci perhaps? If this is
true, it would explain why there seems to be such a
“jump” when presenting Goethe’s work on color in
workshops. Nevertheless, by whatever means Goethe
came to it, the recognition that there is a connection
between the prismatic colors and the colors of the sun
and sky is an insight in itself. For further discussion
of the Urphänomen, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 231–46.
22. Significantly, when one uses the prism to view
a black rectangle on a white background, one sees
how the two colored edges move together in reverse
order and “blend” to generate a new color—a rubymagenta, or “peach blossom,” that is the complementary color to green. One can now form a circle that
marks Goethe’s color wheel based on complementary
colors. The result is a circle that is a dynamic whole
in which, as Goethe wrote, “no color can be considered stationary.”
23. For a discussion of the ambiguities and hidden
influences in Newton’s 1672 paper to the Royal Society, see Bortoft 1996, pp. 192–212.
24. For example, Holdrege 1998; Riegner 1993,
1998, 2008; Schad 2019.
25. No citations are provided for these quotations.
26. Bortoft explains that, in this diagram, he adapts
a notation used by Ernst Cassirer in Substance and
Form (Cassirer 1980).
27. No citations are provided for these quotations.
28. There can be no transcendence without immanence, or immanence without transcendence because
each is the condition of possibility for the other. There
is duality here but no dualism—no dichotomy as there
is in the two-world theory, where each world is mutually external to the other. The difficulty arises from
the counterfeit transcendence, which has the quality
of externality and is therefore conceived as being separate from and outside the sense world, and hence as
another “world” (see Miller 2005, esp. pp. 120–21).
Significantly, Plato was not a Platonist—he did not
subscribe to the two-world theory that is central to the
Western metaphysical tradition. In view of this, we
should perhaps refer to the Neoplatonic tradition, especially as it influenced the development of modern
science from the Renaissance onward, as “pseudoPlatonism” (See Bortoft 2012, pp. 158–59, pp. 183–
86).
29. This idea of a unified science is the source of
the Enlightenment idea of universality in human nature and the belief in universal reason that can discover universal principles in morality, politics, and
religion, as well as in science.
30. Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p. 64. The implication here is not that Chinese culture is somehow deficient. Rather, comparative studies illustrate that
Chinese culture emphasizes aspects of phenomena
different from those emphasized in modern Western
culture, most notably giving priority to the uniquely
particular rather than the underling unity. This difference means that the Chinese culture developed a
mode of perception that we Westerners tend to lack,
just as our Western culture has developed some

modes of understanding not traditionally found in
Chinese culture.
31. And, subsequently, the emergence of the Nation State, with its transition from common law to
statute law.
32. See Needleman, 1976.
33. No citations are provided for these quotations.
In his last entry of this list, Bortoft quotes Rudolf Steiner (1963), who wrote that Goethe “seeks to bring the
diversity back into the unity from which it originally
went forth.”
34. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “You know
that you’ve seen it when you feel that your seeing has
been turned inside out.”
35. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “I have
found a Busy Lizzie plant very helpful.”
36. See Bortoft’s earlier discussion of active seeing
and sensorial imagination.
37. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “As simple
as these examples are, it helps to think doing them in
imagination instead of only thinking of the result.”
38. Bortoft attributes this quotation to philosopher
J.G. Bennett but does not provide a citation. On
Bortoft’s relationship with Bennett, see the earlier
part of this essay.
39. The intensive dimension of One is no stranger
than many of the “difficulties” we face in quantum
physics—think, for example, of the interference experiment with a single photon. The fact that we cannot
map the intensive dimension of the One into a sensory
representation does not mean that it is an abstraction.
On the contrary, “multiplicity in unity” is a concrete
unity, even though it cannot be recognized sensorily
or caught in the logic of solid bodies. It is “unity in
multiplicity” that is abstract.
For further discussion of the hologram, see Bortoft
1996, pp. 4–13.
40. No citation is provided for this quotation.
41. In parentheses, Bortoft writes that “A somewhat more static (because non-living) ‘model’ is illustrated by the construction of a multiple hologram,
which lacks the intrinsically dynamical character of
living being but does nevertheless demonstrate the
notion of ‘multiplicity in unity’ in a way that imitates
artificially the dynamical wholeness of living being”—see Bortoft 1996, Part 2, note 58.
42. Bennett 1977, p. 64. Bennett’s precise phrasing
is: “We can hardly bring ourselves to see that there
are doings that be things. If I say something, it is not
I that says it but that the speaking says me.”
43. No citation is given for this quotation. For further discussion of Gadamer, see Bortoft 2012, pp.
121–26.
44. See Bortoft 1996, pp. 283–89; Brady 1998.
45. Bortoft 1996, pp. 303–20.
46. No citation is given for this quotation; either
Brady 1987 or 1998?
47. This remarkably valuable insight is discussed
in some detail in Cassirer’s early Substance and
Function (Cassirer 1980). Although he does not explicitly consider the idea of a different mode of unity
(so that he does not consider the generative serial concept [as distinct from the abstract generic concept] in
terms of the of the metamorphosis of One into different modes of itself (i.e., producing an intensive dimension of One), Still, it is clear (even when not made
explicit) that the movement of Cassirer’s thinking is
away from entities in their finished state toward their
coming-into-being. His thinking becomes dynamical.
If one reads what he writes carefully, it becomes clear
from the language he uses that sometimes he moves
toward one mode in his thinking and, at other times,
moves toward the other, sometimes getting caught

more in the product (e.g., “the unification of multiplicity”) and, at other times, becoming free from this
static sense and moving toward the processual (e.g.,
“we have to create this multiplicity”).
48. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 110.
49. Brady 1998.
50. Webster and Goodwin 1996, p. 101.
51. See Bortoft 1996, pp. 212–36.
52. See the first part of this essay for Bortoft’s remarks on Wittgenstein.
53. See Goodwin 1994.
54. As Gadamer (1989, p. 484) explained, “being
is self-presentation.”
55. Bortoft draws on this phrase several times in
Parts I–III of this series.
56. In Wholeness of Nature, Bortoft (1996, p. 290)
writes: “[Systems thinking] tries to put together what
already belongs together. Thus, the intrinsic relatedness is not seen, and instead, external connections are
introduced with a view to overcoming separation. But
the form of such connections is such that they, too,
belong to the level of separation.”
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Bortoft Lectures on-line
Writer Simon Robinson has uploaded on YouTube several lectures
that Henri Bortoft presented on
wholeness at Schumacher College in
the 2000s. These lectures are an excellent introduction to Bortoft’s
thinking, including his understanding
of Goethean science. The links are
below.
There is also available a tape recording of Bortoft’s presentation at
the 2011 J. G. Bennett’s Dramatic
Universe conference; this link is
listed below after the Schumacher
links. Note that, in the early 1960s,
Bortoft was a researcher under the
direction of Bennett.

Lecture 2, Part II:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=351&v=UmdLQMlV3KE
Lecture 3:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=1&v=nsH6-n7BUtw
Lecture 4, Part I:
https://transitionconsciousness.wordpress.com/2018/12/30/the-henribortoft-lectures-day-four-part-one-2/
Lecture 4, Part II:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
aCywGtSeWi4
Lecture 4, Part III:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=2&v=thMjGQzhEN0
Lecture 5, Part I:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I
LVxvP_S9zI
Lecture 5, Part II:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
LLy14NKt0TQ
Bortoft’s J. G. Bennett lecture
https://soundcloud.com/seandotcom1/du-008-henri-bortoft

Bortoft’s Schumacher lectures
Lecture 1:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=8&v=iGEl2E2CcTo
Lecture 2, Part I:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?tim
e_continue=1&v=1Tzx5EOWHe0
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Questions relating to environmental and architectural phenomenology (from EAP, 2014 [vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4])
Questions relating to phenomenology
and related interpretive approaches
and methods:
❖ What is phenomenology and what does
it offer to whom?
❖ What is the state of phenomenological
research today? What are your hopes
and concerns regarding phenomenology?
❖ Does phenomenology continue to have
relevance in examining human experience in relation to world?
❖ Are there various conceptual and methodological modes of phenomenology
and, if so, how can they be categorized
and described?
❖ Has phenomenological research been
superseded by other conceptual approaches—e.g., post-structuralism, social-constructionism, critical theory, relationalist and non-representational perspectives, the various conceptual
“turns,” and so forth?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to making a better world? If so, what are the
most crucial phenomena and topics to
be explored phenomenologically?
❖ Can phenomenological research offer
practical results in terms of design,
planning, policy, and advocacy?
❖ How might phenomenological insights
be broadcast in non-typical academic
ways—e.g., through artistic expression,
theatrical presentation, digital evocation, virtual realities, and so forth?
❖ What are the most important aims for
future phenomenological research?
❖ Do the various post-structural and social-constructionist criticisms of phenomenology—that it is essentialist,
masculinist, authoritative, voluntarist,
ignorant of power structures, and so
forth—point toward its demise?
Questions relating to the natural
world and environmental and ecological concerns:
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of nature and the natural world?
❖ What can phenomenology offer the intensifying environmental and ecological
crises we face today?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to more
sustainable actions and worlds?
❖ Can one speak of a sustainable lifeworld?
❖ What is a phenomenology of a lived environmental ethic and who are the key
contributors?

❖
❖
❖

Do the “sacred” and the “holy” have a
role in caring for the natural world? For
places? For lifeworlds broadly?
Can phenomenology contribute to environmental education? If so, in what
ways?
Can there be a phenomenology of the
two laws of thermodynamics, especially
the second law claiming that all activities, left to their own devices, tend toward greater disorder and fewer possibilities? Are there ways whereby phenomenological understanding of lifeworld might help to reduce the accelerating disordering of natural and human
worlds?

Questions relating to place, place experience, and place meaning:
❖ Why has the notion of place become an
important phenomenological topic?
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding
of place contribute to better place making?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to a
generative understanding of place and
place making?
❖ What roles do bodily regularity and habitual inertia play in the constitution of
place and place experience?
❖ What are the lived relationships between place, sustainability, and a responsive environmental ethic?
❖ How are phenomenological accounts to
respond to post-structural interpretations of space and place as rhizomic and
a “meshwork of paths” (Ingold)?
❖ Can phenomenological accounts incorporate a “progressive sense of place”
argued for by critical theorists like
Doreen Massey?
❖ Can phenomenological explications of
space and place account for human differences—gender, sexuality, lessabledness, social class, cultural background, and so forth?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to the
politics and ideology of place?
❖ Can a phenomenological understanding
of lived embodiment and habitual inertia be drawn upon to facilitate robust
places and to generate mutual support
and understanding among places, especially places that are considerably different (e.g., different ethnic neighborhoods or regions)?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to mobility, the nature of “flows,” rhizomic
spaces, the places of mobility, non-

spaces and their relationship to mobility
and movement?
Questions relating to architecture and
environmental design and policy:
❖ Can there be a phenomenology of architecture and architectural experience and
meaning?
❖ Can phenomenology contribute to better architectural design?
❖ How do qualities of the designable
world—spatiality, materiality, lived
aesthetics, environmental embodiment
etc.—contribute to lifeworlds?
❖ What are the most pertinent environmental and architectural features contributing to a lifeworld’s being one way
rather than another?
❖ What role will cyberspace and digital
technologies have in 21st-century lifeworlds? How will they play a role in
shaping designed environments, particularly architecture?
❖ What impact will digital advances and
virtual realities have on physical embodiment, architectural design, and
real-world places? Will virtual reality
eventually be able to simulate “real reality” entirely? If so, how does such a
development transform the nature of
lifeworld, natural attitude, place, and architecture?
❖ Can virtual worlds become so “real”
that they are lived as “real” worlds?
Other potential questions:
❖ What is the lived relationship between
people and the worlds in which they
find themselves?
❖ Can lifeworlds be made to happen selfconsciously? If so, how? Through what
individual efforts? Through what group
efforts?
❖ Can a phenomenological education in
lifeworld, place, and environmental embodiment assist citizens and professionals in better understand the workings
and needs of real-world places and
thereby contribute to their envisioning
and making?
❖ Is it possible to speak of human-rightsin-place or place justice? If so, would
such a possibility move attention and
supportive efforts toward improving the
places in which people and other living
beings find themselves, rather than focusing only on the rights and needs of
individuals and groups without consideration of their place context?
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Environmental & Architectural

Phenomenology
Published digitally twice a year, EAP is a forum and clearing house
for research and design that incorporate a qualitative approach to
environmental and architectural experience, actions, and meanings.

Beginning in 2016, EAP is digitally open-source only. Current and
back digital issues of EAP are available at the following digital addresses:
https://ksu.academia.edu/DavidSeamon
http://newprairiepress.org/eap/
http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522 (archive copies)

One key concern of EAP is design, education, policy, and advocacy
supporting and strengthening natural and built places that sustain
human and environmental wellbeing. Realizing that a clear conceptual stance is integral to informed research and design, the editor emphasizes phenomenological approaches but also gives attention to related styles of qualitative research. EAP welcomes essays,
letters, reviews, conference information, and so forth. Forward submissions to the editor.

Readers who wish to receive an email notice when a new issue is
electronically available, should send an email to the editor with
that request. Though EAP is now digital, we still have production
costs and welcome reader donations.
Because EAP is now only digital, we have discontinued all library
subscriptions. Libraries that wish to remain subscribed should link
their digital catalogue to the archival digital address provided
above. A limited number of back issues of EAP, in hard copy,
1990–2015, are available for $10/volume (3 issues/volume). Contact the editor for details.

Editor
Dr. David Seamon, Professor Emeritus
Architecture Department
1088 Seaton Hall, 920 17th Street
Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506-2901 USA
tel: 785-532-5953; triad@ksu.edu

Copyright Notice

Exemplary Themes
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

All contents of EAP, including essays by contributors, are protected
by copyright and/or related rights. Individual contributors retain
copyright to their essays and accompanying materials. Interested
parties should contact contributors for permission to reproduce or
draw from their work.

The nature of environmental and architectural experience;
Sense of place, including place identity and place attachment;
Architectural and landscape meaning;
The environmental, architectural, spatial, and material dimensions of lifeworlds;
Changing conceptions of space, place, and nature;
Home, dwelling, journey, and mobility;
Environmental encounter and its relation to environmental responsibility and action;
Environmental and architectural atmospheres and ambiences;
Environmental design as place making;
Sacred space, landscape, and architecture;
The role of everyday things—furnishings, tools, clothing, interior design, landscape features, and so forth—in supporting
people’s sense of environmental wellbeing;
The progressive impact of virtual reality on human life and
how it might transform the lived nature of “real” places, buildings, and lifeworlds;
The practice of a lived environmental ethic.

Open Access Policy
EAP provides immediate access to its content on the principle that
making research freely available to the public supports a greater
global exchange of knowledge.

Archival Policy
EAP is archived for perpetual access through the participation of
Kansas State University’s New Prairie Press in CLOCKSS (“Controlled Lots of Copies Keep Stuff Safe”) and Portico, managed
through the Digital Commons Publishing platform. New Prairie
Press also participates in LOCKSS (Lots of Copies Keep Stuff
Safe). Once published, an issue’s contents are never changed. Archival copies of EAP are also available at Kansas State University’s digital archive, K-Rex (see links above).

For additional themes and topics, see the preceding page, which
outlines a series of relevant questions originally published in the
25th-anniversary issue of EAP in 2014 (vol. 25, no. 3, p. 4).

Note: All entries for which no author is given are by the EAP Editor.
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